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What do the Oscars, Australia, and the City of San Francisco have 
in common?  All three use an unconventional voting system1 to select 
winners in their respective contests for Academy Awards or political 
office called instant-runoff voting (IRV).2  In IRV elections, voters 
rank multiple candidates for a single position, rather than only 
picking a single candidate for a given position.3  Recently, IRV has 
become an increasingly discussed option for electoral systems both at 
the state and city level.4  In 2016, Maine became the first state to 
 
 1. See Katharine Q. Seelye, As Australia and the Oscars Go, So Goes Maine?, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Seelye, So Goes Maine?], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html 
[https://perma.cc/MV8Z-CSCV]. 
 2. Outside of the legal world, IRV tends to be referred to as “ranked-choice 
voting,” but legal scholars have insisted on referring to it as IRV. In deference to 
their infinite wisdom, this Note will do the same. San Francisco is largely credited 
with creating the term “ranked-choice voting.” See S.F. CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 
13.102 (2004); Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not 
Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of A Voting System, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 334 n.35 (2006). There is no substantive difference between 
the two, and the labels can be used interchangeably, but this Note will avoid doing so 
for purposes of clarity. 
 3. See Seelye, So Goes Maine?, supra note 1. 
 4. Id.; see also In Praise of Ranked-Choice Voting, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/06/14/in-praise-of-ranked-choice-
2019] RECLAIMING ELECTORAL HOME RULE 1297 
adopt IRV and implemented the system statewide in 2018 — doing so 
for its U.S. Senate and House races.5 
Proponents of IRV argue that it has many benefits, but the central 
idea behind the system is that it is the most efficient means of 
preventing unpopular candidates from winning elections with a 
plurality — rather than a majority — of the vote.6  One recent 
example of the kind of result IRV seeks to prevent is the 2018 
Democratic primary for Massachusetts’s third congressional district, 
where Lori Trahan declared victory after securing less than 21% of 
the vote.7 
Those in favor of IRV argue that it does more than just combat 
low-plurality winners.  Perhaps most importantly, IRV elections can 
replace costly and relatively low-turnout runoff and primary elections, 
saving cities and states tens of millions of dollars while increasing 
voter participation.8  Additionally, by creating a system that 
incentivizes candidates to appeal to a broader swath of the electorate, 
rather than just their base, IRV can help combat hyper-partisan 
campaigning and governing.9  This can give voters in the political 
minority a louder voice in their government10 and increase voter 
satisfaction with the electoral process.11  This can be particularly 
important in cities like New York City, where one party often 
 
voting [https://perma.cc/4DG2-GHXX]. In addition to public elections, there have 
also been calls to implement IRV in private settings, such as corporate elections. See 
generally G. Scott Edwards, Empowering Shareholders, or Overburdening 
Companies? Analyzing the Potential Use of Instant Runoff Voting in Corporate 
Elections, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (2015). 
 5. Katharine Q. Seelye, Maine Adopts Ranked-Choice Voting. What Is It, and 
How Will It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Seelye, Maine Adopts 
RCV], https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html 
[https://perma.cc/9V44-DFNM]; Timeline of Ranked Choice Voting in Maine, 
FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/maine_ballot_initiative [https://perma.cc/K7KD-
WJ7N] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 6. Dick Dadey, Instant Run-Off Voting: End High Cost, Low Turnout Run-Off 
Elections, 19 CITY L. 118 (2013); see also Edward B. Foley, Third-Party and 
Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need for a Runoff Mechanism, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 993, 1012–20 (2016) (arguing for IRV in presidential elections to 
prevent unpopular presidential candidates from winning under the electoral college). 
 7. Katharine Q. Seelye, Fans of Ranked Voting See an Opportunity in 
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Seelye, Massachusetts], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/massachusetts-voting-lori-trahan.html 
[https://perma.cc/8M29-5839]. 
 8. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 9. Benefits of RCV, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#rcvbenefits 
[https://perma.cc/SX2Z-AX5H] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
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dominates local politics.12  It is also relevant in traditionally 
conservative states like Texas, where the conservative leanings of the 
state are often at odds with the goals of progressive cities like Dallas, 
or El Paso.13  In statewide IRV systems, gubernatorial candidates in 
states with a city-state political dynamic similar to that of Texas would 
be incentivized to appeal to voters beyond the traditionally 
conservative state electorate.14 
While only one state has implemented IRV thus far, many cities 
have been using the system for some time,15 and more cities and 
 
 12. In New York City, Democrats have a firm grip on the electorate. In the 2016 
presidential election, it voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidate Hillary 
Clinton, as she received 79% of the vote from the city. Seth Barron, New York’s Red 
Borough, CITY J. (2018), https://www.city-journal.org/html/new-yorks-red-borough-
15652.html [https://perma.cc/QWL4-6S63] (describing the extremely Democratic 
political demographics of New York City, with Staten Island as a Republican 
anomaly). 
 13. Ross Ramsey, Analysis: The Blue Dots in Texas’ Red Political Sea, TEX. TRIB. 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/11/11/analysis-blue-dots-texas-
red-political-sea/ [https://perma.cc/JFT2-B3A2]; see also Rick Su, Have Cities 
Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 188 (2017) (discussing the 
political divide between progressive cities and conservative state legislatures). 
 14. Problems RCV Can Help Solve, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/problems_rcv_can_help_solve [https://perma.cc/QS49-
G8LR] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 15. San Francisco, for example, has been using IRV since 2004. Spotlight: Bay 
Area, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/spotlight_bay_area#history_of_rcv_in_bay_area 
[https://perma.cc/FVU9-24V2] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). See generally Where Is 
Ranked Choice Voting Used?, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used 
[https://perma.cc/GZ5N-XGTC] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). The first U.S. city to use 
some form of IRV was Cambridge, MA, which utilized IRV since the 1940s and 
continues to do so today. Spotlight: Cambridge, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/spotlight_cambridge#history_rcv_cambridge 
[https://perma.cc/2BNH-MGM5] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). Other cities currently 
using some form of IRV include: Basalt, CO, Berkeley, CA, Minneapolis, MN, 
Takoma Park, MD, and Telluride, CO. Where is Ranked Choice Voting Used?, 
FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used 
[https://perma.cc/5T22-VG7M] (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). The cities that currently 
implement IRV, which include Oakland, St. Paul, and Minneapolis, tend to be 
progressive when measured by their policy preferences. Chris Tausanovitch & 
Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 3, 38 (2014) (measuring policy preferences of public in cities with populations 
above 250,000). But the correlation between progressive cities and RCV has changed 
recently, as the number of IRV bills being introduced in local and state legislatures 
has increased dramatically. Between 2018 and 2019, state IRV legislation has been 
introduced in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington. H.J.M. 19, 53d Leg. Sess., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2018); H.B. 35, 62d Leg., 2018 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2018); S. Bill 641, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); H.B. 6881, Gen. 
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states are now seriously considering employing IRV in future 
elections.16  This includes New York City, the largest city in the 
country,17 and one that often portrays itself as a champion of 
progressive policies.18  For New York City, as with many other cities 
in the United States, implementing any major change to local election 
law presents a potentially complex legal issue, as there are often 
conflicts between state law and local law in this arena.19  New York 
State law prescribes a runoff mechanism for three New York City 
primaries — including its mayoral primaries.20  In considering IRV 
for its primary elections (or any other change to its local elections), 
New York City risks potential preemption challenges from the state 
that could thwart any attempt to alter its voting laws.21  In particular, 
§ 6-162 of New York’s Election Law likely preempts the City from 
unilaterally altering its voting laws to implement IRV.22  While 
amending § 6-162 to provide for IRV is one way to address this issue, 
 
Assemb., Jan. Sess., (Conn. 2019); S.B. 427, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.  2019); S.B. 
306, 121st Gen, Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019); H.B. 26, 439th Gen. Assemb. 
(Md. 2019); H.F. 983, 91st Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019); H.B. 28, 100th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); J.Res. 5496, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2019); H.B. 
2751, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.B 1722, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); S.F. 
65, 65th Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019). Some of these laws seek to implement 
IRV for statewide elections (including federal elections). See, e.g., H.B. 28, 100th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (requiring IRV in all state and local elections). Others 
affirmatively grant localities the ability to use IRV in their local elections. See, e.g., 
H.B. 26, 439th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (authorizing the mayor and city council of 
Baltimore to adopt IRV or open primary systems). There was also legislation 
introduced in 2019 in New York State that seeks to mandate IRV for New York 
City’s primary elections. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 16. In 2017, 25 bills were introduced in 14 states to implement IRV in various 
local elections. Dan Diorio & Wendy Underhill, Ranked-Choice Voting, 25 NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 24 (June 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/ranked-choice-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/CWX8-BPKJ]; see Where is 
Ranked Choice Voting Used?, supra note 15. 
 17. See US City Populations, WORLD POP. REV., 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/ [https://perma.cc/J7PM-9QMC] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 18. See, e.g., David Weigel, Bill de Blasio Declares a ‘New Progressive Era’ in 
New York, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/01/01/bill-de-blasio-
declares-a-new-progressive-era-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/AX6Q-NFCQ]. 
 19. See James P. Langan, Note, Instant Runoff Voting: A Cure that Is Likely 
Worse than the Disease, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573–75 (2005) (noting the 
failure of cities in the States of Washington and Texas to implement IRV where it 
was deemed inconsistent with state law). 
 20. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018). 
 21. See infra Part II.A.i. 
 22. N.Y. ELEC. LAW, § 6-162. 
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efforts to do so at the state level have been unsuccessful.23  Further, 
given the fact that New York State Law regulates this aspect of New 
York City elections, § 6-162 will remain a legal obstacle for New York 
City in the future even if it is amended to prescribe IRV for city 
primary elections.24  As long as § 6-162 remains in effect, New York 
City will not have the same legal autonomy to regulate its own 
elections as other localities throughout the state. 
This Note argues that New York City should implement IRV for its 
elections, but it should not do so through the options currently being 
advocated — those options being a unilateral city charter revision or 
an amendment to § 6-162 at the state level.  Through a careful 
analysis of § 6-162, its legislative history, subsequent judicial 
interpretations, and existing legislation, this Note ultimately 
concludes that § 6-162 violates both the New York Constitution and 
the basic principles embodied in New York’s home rule doctrine.  For 
this reason, this Note argues that § 6-162 should first be repealed or 
declared unconstitutional, and only then should New York City 
implement IRV through a charter revision. 
Part I begins with an overview of the predominant electoral 
systems in the United States.  It also provides an overview of IRV and 
examines arguments by its proponents, who claim that it is a better 
system than first-past-the-post and runoff schemes, and by its critics, 
who disagree.  Part II focuses specifically on New York State and 
New York City — the current electoral dynamic between the city and 
the state, how that dynamic developed, and how this structure creates 
a legal obstacle that prevents New York City from unilaterally 
implementing IRV for its most important city elections.  In its final 
Part, this Note first argues that, from a policy perspective, IRV makes 
sense and more cities and states, including New York City, should 
adopt it.  Part III also presents multiple solutions that would allow 
New York City to unilaterally implement IRV, but ultimately 
concludes that a direct challenge to the constitutional validity of § 6-
 
 23. See infra Part II.B.ii. However, New York State politics changed dramatically 
in the 2018 state elections. Prior to these elections, Republicans had 31 seats in the 
state senate while Democrats held 21 seats. In the other chamber of the state 
legislature, the state house of representatives, the Democrats had an overwhelming 
majority. After the 2018 elections, Democrats gained control of both chambers of the 
state legislature, picking up 19 seats in the senate and 2 seats in the house. See Jesse 
McKinley & Shane Goldmacher, Democrats Finally Control the Power in Albany. 
What Will They Do With It?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/nyregion/democrats-ny-albany-cuomo-
senate.html [https://perma.cc/Y4CN-JMXV]. 
 24. See infra Part II.B.ii. 
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162 — one that would unambiguously clear the way for unilateral 
implementation by the City — is the best path forward. 
I. ONLY IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Because the U.S. Constitution delegates the power to regulate 
elections — city, state, and federal — to the states,25 the United States 
has a uniquely decentralized electoral system, where different states 
employ different systems, and cities within those states often employ 
systems different from the state in their local elections.26  This Part 
examines the major voting schemes utilized by cities and states in the 
United States.  Section I.A examines the most popular voting system: 
first-past-the-post.  Section I.B examines runoff elections, while 
Section I.C will examine primary elections.  Section I.D examines 
instant-runoff voting, how advocates for this kind of system have 
argued it can solve the various problems associated with first-past-
the-post, primary, and runoff systems — and critics’ responses to 
those arguments.  Lastly, Section I.E will explore IRV advocacy less 
abstractly by examining New York City and how lawmakers and 
advocates at both the state and city level have attempted to bring 
IRV to New York City. 
A. First-Past-the-Post Voting Systems 
In order to discuss instant-runoff voting, it is first necessary to 
establish a working understanding of the predominant voting scheme 
in the United States: first-past-the-post27 (FPP).28  Under FPP 
 
 25. The Constitution provides that states may establish “[t]he Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
4, cl. 1. Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the broad 
authority states have to regulate federal and state elections. See, e.g., Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–462 (1991) (“‘the Framers of the Constitution intended 
the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power 
to regulate elections’” (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–125 (1970)). 
But see Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (noting that although 
the states retain the power to regulate elections, “the Federal Government retains 
significant control over federal elections”). 
 26. For an excellent overview of the variety of electoral systems in the United 
States, including an interactive map, see Electoral Systems in the United States, 
FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/research_electoralsystemsus 
[https://perma.cc/9ECS-3EYG] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 27. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333 (“Plurality voting is the most commonly used 
voting system for single-member districts in the United States.”). For a detailed 
description of various voting systems, see DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT 
BOX 65 (2000). The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is also a useful and 
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systems, the candidate who receives the most votes is declared the 
winner.29  This is true whether the candidate receives 99% or 9% of 
the total vote, as long as that total is greater than that of the next best 
candidate.  Every state except Maine utilizes this system for federal 
elections, including presidential elections.30  While FPP elections 
seem intuitive for many people, they can lead to seemingly 
undemocratic results in cases where a candidate wins with 
significantly less than a majority percentage of the total vote.31  This 
 
interactive website for understanding how different electoral systems are designed. 
Electoral Systems, ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, 
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/ese/ese01/ese01a [https://perma.cc/A4V7-K5E7] 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 28. “First-Past-the-Post” has also been referred to as “winner-take-all,” but 
political scientists and academics alike prefer FPP, so this Note will follow suit. 
 29. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333. 
 30. See Charles King, Electoral Systems, GEO. UNIV. (2000), 
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm [https://perma.cc/JR4C-
UAKD]. Much has been written about reforming the method by which states select 
electors for presidential elections, with IRV proposed as one option. See American 
Democracy’s Built-In Bias Towards Rural Republicans, ECONOMIST (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/12/american-democracys-built-in-bias-
towards-rural-republicans [https://perma.cc/7C97-7CFX] (arguing that FPP has given 
rise to increased partisanship in national elections and that IRV “give[s] office-
seekers a reason to build bridges with opponents rather than torch them.”); Eric 
Maskin & Amartya Sen, Opinion, A Better Electoral System in Maine, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/10/opinion/electoral-system-
maine.html [https://perma.cc/JU7T-PTQV] (describing how IRV would have changed 
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election). 
 31. There are many examples of this, including the 2000 and 2016 presidential 
elections where presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump secured victories by 
winning the electoral vote but not the popular vote. These both translated to plurality 
wins because states select their electors for the electoral college based on whoever 
wins the state by a plurality. See 2016 Presidential Election, 270 TO WIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/2016_Election/ [https://perma.cc/5AH3-PMLE] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019); 2000 Presidential Election, 
https://www.270towin.com/2000_Election [https://perma.cc/YBH9-FEDN] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019); see also Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: 
An Introduction and Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 982–87 (2016). Indeed, 
simulations show that Trump would have lost most of the Republican primary 
contests if every state employed the system for presidential primaries. See Andrew 
Douglas et al., Simulating Instant Runoff Flips Most Donald Trump Primary 
Victories, FAIRVOTE (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.fairvote.org/simulating_instant_runoff_flips_most_donald_trump_primar
y_victories [https://perma.cc/3UD5-WPEV]. While these are the most well-known 
instances of controversial plurality winners, there are many more examples in 
gubernatorial and congressional races, such as Maine’s 2014 gubernatorial, where 
Paul LePage won re-election with around 48% of the vote. In fact, it was the re-
election of Mr. LePage that spurred Maine to become the first state to adopt IRV. 
See Seelye, So Goes Maine?, supra  note 1 and accompanying text. In the 
congressional context, Lori Trahan won the Democratic primary for a congressional 
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risk directly increases as the number of candidates in a given field 
increases.32  In a two-candidate race, which is typically a general 
election, FPP does not pose this problem, because one of those 
candidates will necessarily need to secure a majority in order to win.  
But in a more crowded field, such as a primary election where there 
can be upwards of ten candidates, a candidate could hypothetically 
win by securing only about 10% of the vote.33 
FPP systems also incentivize hyper-partisanship by candidates.  In 
a crowded field, a candidate in an FPP system is rewarded by isolating 
a faction of the electorate rather than by appealing more broadly to 
the entire electorate, especially in a single-party primary.34  This, by 
extension, incentivizes negative campaigning by candidates, where the 
focus is on attacking opponents and isolating a faction, rather than on 
advocating for their policies — something that gets voter’s attention, 
but they paradoxically detest.35 
B. Traditional Runoff Systems 
Several states36 and cities37 mitigate the problem of low-plurality 
winners through a runoff mechanism within their respective FPP 
 
seat based in Lowell, Massachusetts by securing less than 21% of the vote. Seelye, 
Massachusetts, supra note 7. 
 32. E.g., Seelye, Massachusetts, supra note 7 and accompanying text (primary 
winner declared after securing 21% of the vote in a field of ten candidates). 
 33. See, e.g., id. 
 34. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Secret to Cracking Trump’s Base, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/opinion/trump-base-polls.html 
[https://perma.cc/CYK9-JXU6]. Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign is a 
great illustration of this phenomenon. Then-candidate Trump was successful in the 
Republican primaries largely because he isolated a faction, what many commentators 
referred to and still refer to as his “base.” Id. The crowded field of Republican 
contenders created a scenario where a candidate, like Trump, needed to secure only a 
larger percentage of the vote than the next best candidate, and he could do so by 
attacking both Republicans and Democrats. See Paul Schwartzman & Jenna Johnson, 
It’s Not Chaos. It’s Trump’s Campaign Strategy, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/its-not-chaos-its-trumps-campaign-
strategy/2015/12/09/9005a5be-9d68-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6CU4-9LKF]; see also Massimo Bordignon et al., Moderating 
Political Extremism: Single Round Versus Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule, 
106 AM. ECON. REV. 8, 2349–70 (2016) (comparing the influence of extremist voters 
on candidates in plurality systems to runoff systems). 
 35. See John Cassidy, Closing Arguments: The Logic of Negative Campaigning, 
NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/closing-
arguments-the-logic-of-negative-campaigning [https://perma.cc/3F68-55R]. 
 36. See ALA. CODE § 17-13-18 (2018) (held unconstitutional on other grounds by 
United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2015)); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7-
102, 7-7-202, 7-7-304 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-501 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
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systems.38  In these jurisdictions, “runoff”39 elections are held if no 
candidate emerges from a primary (or in some cases, general) election 
without the majority of the vote or with less than a statutorily 
prescribed threshold.40  In a runoff election, the candidate(s) 
receiving the lowest percentage of the vote in the initial election are 
“run off” the ballot and do not appear as choices in the subsequent 
runoff election.41  This typically allows one of the remaining 
candidates to capture a majority — or the requisite threshold 
percentage — of the vote and claim victory.42 
While runoff elections can help combat low-plurality winners in 
FPP systems, there are two main critiques of runoff systems.  First, 
holding a second election is expensive.43  In New York City, for 
example, the last runoff election cost the city more money than the 
entire annual budget for the office for which the runoff was being 
conducted.44  Additionally, it has been empirically shown that in a 
subsequent runoff election, turnout drastically decreases — especially 
among poor and minority voters.45  Because of this, runoff voting 
 
23-15-191 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-103 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-50 
(1976); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 172.003-172.004 (1986). 
 37. See, e.g., BALT., MD., CODE art. IV, § 1 (2018); L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE art. 
IV, § 425 (2015). See generally Portland St. Univ. & the Knight Foundation, Who 
Votes for Mayor? (2016), http://www.whovotesformayor.org/ [https://perma.cc/WJ59-
QLD3] (noting that primary elections with a runoff mechanism are the most popular 
method for mayoral elections in U.S. cities). 
 38. Two states — Georgia and Louisiana — currently conduct general election 
runoffs for federal and state-level positions. Runoff Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Runoff_election [https://perma.cc/8HBK-A52Q] (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2019). Ten states conduct runoffs in their primary elections. Primary Runoffs, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XCS-WJTY] (last visited Oct. 7, 
2019). 
 39. Runoff systems are also sometimes referred to as “two-round” systems. See, 
e.g., Electoral Systems: Two-Round System, ACE ELECTORAL NETWORK, 
http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd04.htm [https://perma.cc/MEE9-HR96] (last 
visited October 7, 2019). 
 40. O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. The “average cost” of a runoff election would be an inappropriate statistic for 
demonstrating this point because cost is often relative to the size of the jurisdiction in 
which the election is taking place. But there are clear overall costs of runoff elections. 
See infra Section I.C. 
 44. See infra Section I.C. 
 45. See Bernard L. Fraga, The Turnout Gap Between Whites and Racial 
Minorities Is Larger than You Think — and Hard to Change, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 
2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/25/the-
turnout-gap-between-whites-and-racial-minorities-is-larger-than-you-think-and-hard-
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systems have been challenged a number of times on constitutional 
grounds, as well as on the grounds that they violate the Voting Rights 
Act, but such challenges have been largely unsuccessful.46 
C. Primary Elections 
Much like FPP voting, primary elections are extremely popular 
throughout the United States.47  Primaries are elections utilized by 
parties in order to narrow the field of candidates so that only one 
candidate will ultimately run as the party’s candidate in the general 
election.48  Prior to primary elections, the candidate who would 
appear on the ballot as the given party’s nominee would directly or 
indirectly be chosen by “party bosses.”49  The primary was, and still is, 
seen as a purer form of democracy50 where the voters, rather than 
party leaders, have a say in who will ultimately emerge as the party’s 
nominee for a given position.51 
 
to-change/ [https://perma.cc/7P4S-9J7W]; Elaine C. Kamarck, The Importance of 
Increasing Turnout in Congressional Primaries, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 
28, 2016), 
https://ssir.org/increasing_voter_turnout/entry/the_importance_of_increasing_turnout
_in_congressional_primaries [https://perma.cc/SGR2-KCDZ]; Kelly Born, Increasing 
Voter Turnout: What, If Anything, Can Be Done?, STAN. SOC. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016) 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/increasing_voter_turnout_what_if_anything_can_be_don
e [https://perma.cc/X7AS-9S2E]. 
 46. See generally Gregory G. Ballard, Note, Application of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act to Runoff Primary Election Laws, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1991) 
(arguing that jurisdictions requiring majority threshold dilute minority vote in 
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act). See also infra note 202. For additional 
critiques of runoff systems, see Benefits of RCV, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/rcvbenefits [https://perma.cc/467F-8US6] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2019). For example, a candidate who could have ultimately won the election may not 
be on the ballot in the second round, but voters may have voted differently if they 
knew a certain candidate did not garner enough votes to reach the majority 
threshold. Id. 
 47. BENJAMIN GINSBERG ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN POLITICS 349 (Ann Shin et al. eds., 8th ed. 2011). In fact, the United 
States is one of the only countries in the world to utilize a primary system. Id. 
 48. See generally id. 
 49. U.S. Political Conventions and Campaigns, NE. UNIV., 
https://conventions.cps.neu.edu/nominations-conventions/past-practices/primaries-
and-conventions/ [https://perma.cc/L6YV-4HQW] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 50. For a comprehensive overview of the origins of primary elections, see 
CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM & LOUISE OVERACKER MERRIAM, PRIMARY 
ELECTIONS (1928). 
 51. It should be noted that the meaning and impact of primary election votes 
depends, in part, on the particular kind of primary system that is used — open, 
closed, or blanket. See Sean M. Ramaley, Comment, Is The Bell Tolling: Will the 
Death of the Partisan Blanket Primary Signal the End for Open Primary Elections?, 
63 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 218–20 (2001). In a closed primary, a voter is only permitted 
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Primaries are not perfect in practice, however, and they have the 
same major issues as runoff voting mechanisms: cost and turnout.  In 
2016, the combined cost of statewide primary elections in all states 
was just under $500 million.52  California accounted for one-fifth of 
this cost, where the 2016 presidential primaries cost its taxpayers 
around $100 million.53  It is important to note that these costs are in 
addition to the costs for running a general election, which are even 
more expensive to conduct than primary elections.54  Primary 
 
to vote in the primary election for candidates from the same political party under 
which he or she is registered. Id. at 219. In open primaries, voters are permitted to 
vote in whichever party’s primary they prefer, regardless of their own party 
affiliation, but they are restricted to only voting in one party’s primary. Id. Lastly, in 
blanket primaries “all voters receive the same ballot, and a voter is not limited to the 
candidates of any single party but may vote, as to each office contested, for any 
candidate regardless of party affiliation.” Id. at 219–20 (quoting Cal. Democratic 
Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1997)). Blanket primaries have 
been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because they violate a party’s 
First Amendment associational rights. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 
577 (2000) (“[Blanket primaries] force[] political parties to associate with — to have 
their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by — those who, at best, have 
refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival. 
In this respect, it is qualitatively different from a closed primary.”). In considering the 
constitutionality of a state’s primary regime, the Supreme Court has shown a 
preference for the associational rights of a party where the party itself wants to open 
(or close) its primary election to those who are not affiliated with any party or even 
members of other parties. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 
208, 215 (1986) (holding that Connecticut’s law prohibiting parties from conducting 
open primaries impermissibly violated the associational rights of parties wishing to 
conduct open primaries). In what is perhaps an issue regarding primaries the 
Supreme Court will visit in the future, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently upheld Hawaii’s state law requiring open primaries. Democratic 
Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 833 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016). The case was interesting 
in that the state law at issue was very similar to California’s blanket primary law that 
the Supreme Court struck down in Jones. Like California’s law, Hawaii’s constitution 
required parties to allow all voters, regardless of political affiliation, to participate in 
their primaries. Id. at 1121 (citing HAW. CONST. art. II, § 4). However, unlike the 
California law in Jones, Hawaii’s constitution did not allow “cross voting,” which is a 
scheme where a voter can change which party’s candidate they vote for office by 
office. Id. (“[V]oters must commit to one party’s slate prior to voting; they may not 
choose a Republican nominee for one state office and a Democratic nominee for a 
different state office.”). This was apparently enough of a distinction for the Ninth 
Circuit, but it remains to be seen if such a distinction is sufficient in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court, which denied the Hawaii State Democrats petition for writ of 
certiorari after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago, 137 S. 
Ct. 2114 (2017). 
 52. Taxpayer Costs of Closed Primaries, OPEN PRIMARIES, 
https://www.openprimaries.org/taxpayer_costs_of_closed_primaries 
[https://perma.cc/KQJ4-E4RD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Stephen Ansolabehere, The Search for New Voting Technology, BOS. 
REV. (Oct. 1, 2001), https://bostonreview.net/forum/stephen-ansolabehere-search-
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elections also suffer the same turnout issue as runoff elections, as 
turnout is far lower than in general elections and those that do 
participate in primary elections tend to be older, whiter, and richer.55 
D. Instant-Runoff Voting 
IRV seeks to combat the issues of FPP systems and extract the 
benefits of runoff voting without the incurring the additional costs 
and low-turnout.  A typical IRV system requires voters to rank 
candidates in order of preference, rather than picking only one 
candidate like they do in traditional FPP systems.56  If no candidate 
wins a majority of first-place votes in the initial round of vote-tallying, 
the last place candidate is eliminated, and the votes are redistributed 
based on voters’ listed preferences.57  This process continues until a 
candidate emerges with a majority of first-place votes.58 
Not all IRV systems are the same, however.  They can differ based 
on the number of candidates a voter can rank, how many candidates a 
voter is required to rank, and the threshold vote percentage 
requirement a candidate must reach before being declared the 





new-voting-technology-0 [https://perma.cc/ZA9T-HTTK] (discussing MIT study that 
estimated America’s counties and municipalities spent $1 billion conducting the 2000 
elections); see also Brad Tuttle, How Much Election Day Costs the Country — and 
Voters, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/money/4556642/election-day-2016-costs-
country-voters/ [https://perma.cc/9VPP-AY24]. 
 55. See supra note 45; see also What Affects Voter Turnout Rates?, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/what_affects_voter_turnout_rates [https://perma.cc/8VG5-
8FUM] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 56. See generally Brian P. Marron, One Person, One Vote, Several Elections?: 
Instant Runoff Voting and the Constitution, 28 VT. L. REV. 343, 343–47 (2004) 
(describing IRV as a system “having a second distinct — but not independent — 
election”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. San Francisco, California allows — but does not require — voters to rank up 
to three candidates and has a required threshold of 50% for a candidate to be 
declared a winner. Marking Your Ballot: Ranked-Choice Voting, S.F. DEP’T  
ELECTIONS, https://sfelections.sfgov.org/marking-your-ballot [https://perma.cc/S8GM-
TAUC] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Cambridge, Massachusetts allows — but also does 
not require — voters to rank as many candidates as can appear on the ballot. 
Cambridge Municipal Elections, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 
https://www.cambridgema.gov/Departments/electioncommission/cambridgemunicipal
elections [https://perma.cc/33KG-FTBN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
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Fig. 1.1. Four-Round IRV Election with a Majority Threshold and 
Ranking Requirement 
 
Figure 1.1 shows a hypothetical IRV election involving five 
candidates, A through E, where the required threshold to win is 50% 
— a true majority of votes.  The first round shows the percentage of 
first-place votes each candidate received, with no candidate receiving 
anywhere close to the required 50%.60  Candidate E received the 
fewest first-place votes and is thus eliminated from the vote tallying in 
any subsequent rounds.  Now, votes for the next-ranked candidate by 
any voter who ranked Candidate E first are distributed amongst the 
remaining candidates in the second round.  In the second round, 
Candidate B is eliminated and the process continues for four rounds 
until one candidate — in this case, Candidate A — emerges with a 
majority of the votes.  In this model, the assumption is that each voter 
was required to rank all five of the candidates, so there is no 
possibility that the ultimate winner would not obtain a majority of the 
votes.  Notice an interesting aspect of this race — the candidate who 
initially received the plurality of the vote, Candidate C, did not end 
up winning the election.61 
 
 60. If a candidate did receive a majority of the votes in the first round, the 
election would end without the need for subsequent (instant) runoff rounds. 
 61. A situation where the initial winner of the plurality vote ends up losing the 
election in an IRV system is not purely hypothetical — it has occurred and caused 
predicable controversy. In the 2010 mayoral race for Oakland, California, the initial 
plurality winner, Don Perata, eventually lost to Jean Quan, who implemented a 
campaign strategy that involved attracting other candidates’ supporters for second-
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Essentially, IRV provides the same runoff mechanism as 
traditional runoff systems, but without the time and expense involved 
in an additional election.62  The money IRV can save in this respect is 
perhaps its most demonstrable benefit.  In cities that employ 
traditional runoff systems, like New York City, if no candidate 
reaches a certain threshold percentage of the vote in primary 
elections,63 holding a second runoff election dramatically increases 
the already high cost of conducting a primary election, in addition to a 
general election.64  By replacing runoffs with IRV, governments could 
significantly reduce the cost of conducting elections. 
In addition to runoffs, some proponents have suggested that IRV 
can also eliminate the need for a primary election to be held before a 
general election.65  Indeed, the elimination of primaries in favor of a 
single IRV election has already occurred in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
where the city implemented a single, general IRV election for 
multiple local offices in 2006.66  As previously discussed, primary 
elections are a means of narrowing the field to a single candidate, who 
will represent a political party on a ballot in the general election, 
avoiding the risk that a party will split the vote among its own 
members and hand the election to a candidate from another, more 
 
Election Battles? This November, Maine Hopes to Find Out., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/31/can-ranked-choice-voting-
end-ugly-election-battles-this-november-maine-hopes-find-
out/?utm_term=.ba37be8088f3 [https://perma.cc/HE29-6Y8U]; Zusha Elinson & 
Gerry Shih, The Winning Strategy in Oakland: Concentrate on Being 2nd or 3rd 
Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/us/politics/12bcvoting.html 
[https://perma.cc/2S2Z-S2HT]. More recently, in the first use of IRV for a federal 
congressional election, Bruce Poliquin won more votes than Jared Golden in the first 
round, but ended up losing to Golden in the second round, after Golden captured 
50.6% of the vote. See Jamie Ehrlich, Maine Governor Deems Congressional 
Election ‘Stolen’ While Certifying Result, CNN (Dec. 29, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/politics/maine-governor-certifies-congressional-
election/index.html [https://perma.cc/YN5H-677K]. In certifying the election, then-
Governor Paul LePage wrote “Stolen Election” next to his signature. Paul R. LePage 
(@Governor_LePage), Twitter (Dec. 28, 2018, 2:58 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Governor_LePage/status/1078726890746191872 
[https://perma.cc/Z3L3-2EV4]. 
 62. See Herbert E. Cihak, The Help America Vote Act: Unmet Expectations?, 29 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679, 700 (2007). 
 63. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018); see infra Section II.B.i. 
 64. See supra Section I.C. 
 65. Problems RCV Can Help Solve, supra note 14. 
 66. See Brandt William, Judge Upholds Instant Runoff Voting in Minneapolis, 
MPR NEWS (Jan. 14, 2009), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/01/14/irv_ruling 
[https://perma.cc/LKA3-RMGH]. 
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unified party.67  Advocates of IRV argue that it can serve as a more 
efficient means to the same end.68  Instead of having a separate, costly 
primary with low voter-turnout (relative to the general election), IRV 
would provide one, high-turnout election where voter preferences 
have the best chance to be reflected in the makeup of a city’s or 
state’s elected body.69  Under this approach, however, a party might 
still be concerned with the possibility of candidates splitting the vote 
among the party, allowing a candidate from another party to 
capitalize on that vote splitting.  While this would be an issue in an 
FPP general election where there are multiple candidates from the 
same party, the problem is greatly reduced under IRV.  In Figure 1.2, 
consider the election that was previously discussed, except now the 
candidates are labeled according to party.  In this example, assume 
there was no primary election and instead just one general IRV 
contest where multiple candidates from the same party could appear 
on the ballot. 
 
Figure 1.2. Multi-Candidate Party Representation in General IRV 
Election 
 
As the example shows, while vote-splitting still might occur under 
IRV, its effects are likely negligible in terms of determining the 
ultimate winner of the election.  While too many candidates on the 
ballot from a single party might initially dilute the vote percentage 
 
 67. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 68. Problems RCV Can Help Solve, supra note 14. 
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each of those candidates receive, that dilution will be isolated for the 
most part within the party’s lines.  If the two Republican candidates 
split the party vote 50-50, there is a credible assumption that, when 
the first of those two candidates is eliminated, the remaining 
candidate will receive the eliminated candidate’s votes, because a 
voter who ranked one of the Republican candidates first likely ranked 
the other Republican candidate second.  Ultimately, under IRV, a 
candidate from the more popular party will be declared the winner, 
unlike in an FPP election where, if the more popular party splits the 
vote, a candidate from a less popular party with less of a split might 
end up winning the election. 
Proponents of IRV point to more than just the recouped runoff 
costs as justifying the voting scheme. They argue that IRV also 
combats many of the paramount concerns accompanying traditional 
American electoral systems.70  First, IRV increases the likelihood that 
a winning candidate will have majority support when compared to a 
traditional FPP system.71  Just like in traditional runoff systems, an 
IRV system can mandate that a candidate must obtain the majority of 
votes in order to be declared the winner.72  Conversely, under a FPP 
system with no runoff mechanism, a candidate can win with a 
plurality of votes even where the overall percentage of votes the 
candidate received is far less than a majority.73 
 
 70. See generally Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Ranked-choice_voting_. [https://perma.cc/QKS6-2ERR] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 71. See Michael Lewyn, Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting, 6 PHOENIX L. 
REV. 117, 121 (2012); Data on Ranked-Choice Voting: Voting Preferences, Spoilers 
and Majority Winners, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/data_on_rcv#research_rcvsocialchoice 
[https://perma.cc/DY44-B5BP] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). While there is not much 
data on this aspect of IRV, FairVote is currently using ballot image data to research 
the relative tendencies of IRV and FPP to elect majority winners. Id. 
 72. See Marron, supra note 56, at 343–47. 
 73. See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 333. However, it is still possible under some IRV 
systems that a candidate will emerge a winner even though they failed to receive a 
majority of the vote. See Lewyn, supra note 71, at 122. For example, in a system like 
San Francisco’s, where voters are not required to rank more than one candidate, S.F. 
DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 59, if every voter only chose one candidate, the election 
would operate exactly the same as an FPP election. If enough voters fail to rank a 
sufficient number of candidates, after a given number of rounds, there may just not 
be enough votes to have any single candidate achieve a majority. Additionally, this 
issue could be easily solved if voters were required to rank a given number of 
candidates — a number based on the number of candidates on the ballot that would 
ensure by mathematical certainty the winner would need a majority of votes to win. 
Even with these potential shortcomings, IRV still does a better job on paper at 
ensuring a true majority winner than FPP. 
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Second, proponents argue that IRV increases voter satisfaction.  A 
number of surveys have shown that voters who participate in IRV 
elections feel that their ballot is more meaningful than in a traditional 
system where a voter can only choose one candidate.74  A traditional 
FPP system is essentially a zero-sum game — if a voter chooses a 
candidate that does not win, his or her vote is exhausted.  In an IRV 
system, however, if a voter’s preferred candidate does not win, the 
voter can still impact the election with their subsequent candidate 
rankings.  Proponents of IRV argue that part of this increased voter 
satisfaction is caused by decreased negative campaigning in IRV 
elections.75  Negative campaigning has become increasingly prevalent 
in modern politics, despite its adverse impact on voter satisfaction,76 
and IRV proponents argue that candidates in an IRV election are 
incentivized to compete for first-place votes as well as votes for 
second place, third place, and so on. 77  Put more simply, they argue 
IRV elections incentivize candidates to appeal to a broader swath of 
the electorate, rather than appealing only to their base.78  Although 
negative campaigning can be difficult to quantify, one quantitative 
measure that IRV advocates rely on to bolster this claim is voter 
perception.  In the same surveys previously referenced, voters 
reported perceiving less negative campaigning in IRV cities versus 
cities not employing IRV.79 
However, there are valid criticisms of IRV worth noting.80  One of 
the central critiques is simply a cost-benefit argument: the costs 
associated with implementing IRV are simply not worth the 
purported benefits.81  First, cities that implement IRV typically 
 
 74. See Ranked Choice Voting in Practice: Candidate Civility in Ranked Choice 
Elections, 2013 & 2014 Survey Brief, FAIRVOTE [hereinafter FairVote Survey Brief], 
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/APSA-Civility-Brief-2015  [https://perma.cc/UEX5-
EJCB] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019); see also SARAH JOHN, FAIRVOTE, RANKED 
CHOICE VOTING IN PRACTICE: CANDIDATE CIVILITY AND VOTER UNDERSTANDING 
1–6 (2015) [hereinafter FAIRVOTE CALIFORNIA SURVEY], 
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/CA-rcv-civility-survery  [https://perma.cc/9ZJG-
PPAB]. 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Campaign Civility: Ranked Choice Voting and Civil Campaigning, 
FAIRVOTE https://www.fairvote.org/research_rcvcampaigncivility 
[https://perma.cc/5AMQ-86G6] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 78. See Bordignon et al., supra note 34, at 2349–50. 
 79. FairVote Survey Brief, supra note 74, at 2. 
 80. See generally Langan, supra note 19. 
 81. See, e.g., David Sharp, Ranked Choice as Easy as 1,2,3? Not So Fast, Critics 
Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 9, 2016), 
https://www.apnews.com/62c997cfd2ab403ca0b3c3333e1a9312 
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employ some kind of voter education system in order to introduce the 
system to the electorate and explain the differences between IRV and 
more traditional voting methods.82  While the depth of these voter 
education programs can vary,83 implementing any kind of program 
does require the city to divert its administrative and financial 
resources to some extent.84  Second, counting ballots in an IRV 
system can be extremely time-consuming if done by hand, adding to 
the overall cost of an election.85  Not all electronic voting systems 
have the ability to count IRV ballots,86 and localities might be 
required to replace or update their existing machines.87 
 
[https://perma.cc/PK63-UU9G]; Gordon L. Weil, Ranked-Choice Voting: Costly, 
Complicated, Undemocratic, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2016/09/30/maine-voices-ranked-choice-voting-costly-
complicated-undemocratic/ [https://perma.cc/6QQ4-LPQD]; see also Langan, supra 
note 19, at 1595. 
 82. See, e.g., S.F. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 59. 
 83. See generally CTR. FOR CIVIC DESIGN, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
INTRODUCING RANKED CHOICE VOTING BALLOTS 6–8 (2018), 
https://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Introducing-RCV-Ballots-18-
0803-FNAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRD7-2MRB]. 
 84. However, a 2018 study concluded that “[o]verall, election cycle cost data of 
cities that have implemented RCV shows that any change to the cost of elections 
either during or after the switch to RCV is not statistically significant.” Christopher 
Rhode, The Cost of Ranked Choice Voting, N. ARIZ. U. 15 (2018), 
https://esra.wisc.edu/papers/Rhode.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B3S-DR3Z]. See also The 
Cost of Ranked Choice Voting, MIT ELECTION LAB (July 27, 2018), 
https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/the-cost-of-ranked-choice-voting-522e646db323 
[https://perma.cc/8JCK-G78K] (discussing the study). But see How Much Will It Cost 
to Implement RCV?, VOTER CHOICE MASS., https://www.voterchoicema.org/faq_cost 
[https://perma.cc/75LF-ZLR8] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (estimating the cost of voter 
education in the state of Massachusetts to be $500,000). 
 85. See Langan, supra note 19, at 1585; see, e.g., Steve Brandt, Hand-Counting 
Ballots in Instant-Runoff Vote Called ‘Huge Nightmare’, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2008), 
http://www.startribune.com/hand-counting-in-instant-runoff-vote-called-huge-
nightmare/35201754/ [https://perma.cc/T4DV-7X3T] (discussing the issues 
Minneapolis was expected to face by implementing an IRV without a fully automated 
vote count). 
 86. The three largest voting machine manufacturers in the United States have 
responded to the demand for systems that are compatible with IRV. Election 
Systems and Software (ES&S) machines are all compatible with IRV elections, 
although some may require some modifications, and still require third party software 
to assist with the vote counting. RCV and Election Administration, FAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv_administration#voting_systems_and_rcv 
[https://perma.cc/D86W-HCLX] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Dominion, another one 
of the three main manufacturers, has begun selling a machine which includes a 
module for conducting IRV elections. Id. This machine does not require any third-
party software or modifications, in contrast to the ES&S machines. Id. Hart 
Intercivic, the third major manufacturer, is the only one of these three manufacturers 
to have a federally certified IRV system, although only one city has used its machines 
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Critics also argue that IRV will lead to voter confusion, because 
the system is too complicated for voters who are used to FPP voting,88 
and voters cannot be expected to educate understand the 
consequences of their ranking decisions.89  Moreover, these critics 
point to data suggesting that voter confusion is an issue that 
disproportionately impacts poor and minority voters.90 
Others suggest that IRV does not always guarantee a majority 
winner.91  This is for two reasons.  First, in an IRV system where 
candidates only need to obtain a percentage less than 50% to win, 
IRV still allows candidates to win an election with a plurality of the 
votes, undercutting one of its biggest purported benefits.  This 
scenario is demonstrated in Figure 1.3, where the exact same values 
from Figure 1.1 are used, but there is only a 40% threshold 
requirement to be elected, leading to a different candidate winning 
the election by securing less than a majority of the votes.  In the 
Figure 1.3 election, there is no need for a fourth round, as Candidate 
C reached the prescribed vote requirement in the third round. 
  
 
in an IRV election. Id. Hart Intercivic’s machine does not require third-party 
software like ES&S’s machines. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Dan Diorio & Wendy Underhill, Ranked-Choice Voting, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=p5luAhhYpyE3d&tabid=31410&port
alid=1 [https://perma.cc/DAT6-QNCW] (“The Maine Secretary of State’s office said 
it would need $761,000 in 2017–2018 and $641,000 in 2018–2019 for additional ballot 
pages and updated voting equipment[]” in order to implement IRV state-wide). 
 88. DAVID C. KIMBALL & JOSEPH ANTHONY, VOTER PARTICIPATION WITH 
RANKED CHOICE VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2016), 
http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/KimballRCV.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3BX-TGE4]; 
Langan, supra note 19, at 1592. 
 89. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 81 (“Instead of simply voting for the candidate you 
prefer, each voter must have an election strategy.”). 
 90. See KIMBALL & ANTHONY, supra note 88, at 4 (“[t]here is evidence in 
American elections that confusing voting equipment or ballot designs produce more 
voting errors, and the impact of poor design falls disproportionately on low income 
and minority voters”). 
 91. See Lewyn, supra note 71, at 122 and accompanying text. 
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Fig. 1.3. Three-Round IRV Election with a 40% Threshold and 
Ranking Requirement 
 
Second, in a system where voters are not required to rank a given 
number of candidates, there is no guarantee that voters will rank 
enough candidates to allow the system to work.92 Further, if voters 
only list one preference or if they only list relatively weak candidates, 
their votes may not end up being counted in the later rounds, 
something known as “ballot exhaustion.”93 The example in Figure 1.4 
shows what can occur if an IRV system only requires voters to choose 
one candidate, but allows them to rank up to three candidates.  Under 
such a system, it is possible that most or all voters will only choose a 
single candidate.  If that occurs, and no candidate reaches the 
statutorily proscribed threshold, the last-place candidate would be 
eliminated, but there would be little to no votes to be redistributed 
from each eliminated candidate.  Consequently, the winner may not 
even be able to reach the required threshold to win the election, and 
the system would essentially revert to a traditional FPP system, where 




 92. San Francisco utilizes an IRV statute that does not require voters to rank 
more than one candidate. See S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102 (2002). 
 93. See Simon Waxman, Ranked-Choice Voting Is Not the Solution, 
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Fig. 1.4. IRV Election with a Majority Threshold Requirement and 
No Ranking Requirement 
 
Despite these criticisms, many cities have been using IRV in local 
elections for some time.  San Francisco, the largest U.S. city to utilize 
IRV, has been using it since 2002 in its mayoral elections.94  Twelve 
cities and localities and one state (Maine) currently have some form 
of IRV in place or a system that will be effective by 2021.95  The data 
on IRV from these cities have been generally positive.  The earlier 
referenced FairVote surveys  measuring voter satisfaction in IRV 
jurisdictions found that a majority of voters in IRV cities supported 
using the system in their elections.96  Additionally, in contrast to one 
of the main critiques of IRV — namely, that it tends to lead to voter 
confusion — the surveys found that the vast majority of voters in 
 
 94. S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102 (2002). 
 95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-a, § 723-A (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 96 
(2018) (Cambridge’s electoral code is incorporated into Massachusetts state laws); 
BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.14 (2004); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES art. XI, § 1105 (2018); S.F., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XIII, § 13.102 
(2018); SAN LEANDRO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. II, § 225 (2018); BASALT, COLO., MUN. 
CODE art. II, § 2.8 (2018); CARBONDALE, COLO., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 6-8 (2018); 
PORTLAND, ME., CITY CODE OF ORDINANCES art. II, § 3 (2018); TAKOMA PARK, MD., 
MUN. CHARTER art. VI, § 606 (2018); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
art. III, § 3.1(b) (2018); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. V, Ch. 31 (2018); 
SANTA FE, N.M., MUN. CHARTER art. IV, § 4.06 (2018). 
 96. FairVote Survey Brief, supra note 74, at 2. Additionally, in a 2014 poll of 
California cities, a majority of voters living in cities employing FPP systems 
supported adopting IRV in their local elections. FAIRVOTE CALIFORNIA SURVEY, 
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cities utilizing IRV found that the ballot instructions were easy to 
understand.97 
Since these polls were conducted in 2013 and 2014, the state of 
American politics has undoubtedly undergone a significant 
transformation.  The election of Donald Trump, who employed a no-
holds-barred campaign style where he ruthlessly attacked any and all 
of his political opponents, has emboldened more candidates — both 
Republicans and Democrats — to employ campaign strategies that 
are increasingly critical of their opponents.98  There is limited data on 
how much, if at all, IRV’s ability to reduce negative campaigning will 
translate into a new, much more hostile political climate.  The 
uncertainty of these issues notwithstanding, IRV ultimately has 
proven to be popular in the cities where it has been used.99  
Additionally, while the claims related to campaign conduct may be 
undermined by a shift in the nation’s political climate, the benefits of 
IRV in terms of avoiding additional costs incurred by runoff and 
primary elections likely remain valid. 
Perhaps because of the success of IRV in the cities that have 
already implemented it, more cities are laying the legal groundwork 
for IRV in their future elections.100  Many other cities and states are 
 
 97. FAIRVOTE CALIFORNIA SURVEY, supra note 74, at 6–9; FairVote Survey Brief, 
supra note 74, at 2. 
 98. See Susan B. Glasser, The Dark Certainty of the 2018 Midterms, NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-trumps-
washington/the-dark-certainty-of-the-2018-midterms-donald-trump 
[https://perma.cc/7M8T-AFDA] (noting how Trump has “redefin[ed] American 
politics to suit his own explosive style”); see also, e.g., Anthea Butler, Opinion, 
Democrats Will Lose in 2018 If They Don’t Shut Up About Civility and Shout About 
Our Democracy Dying, NBC NEWS (July 15, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/democrats-will-lose-2018-if-they-don-t-shut-
about-ncna891196 [https://perma.cc/9XR3-U6VG]. 
 99. See also MINN. CITY COUNCIL, STANDING COMM. ON ELECTIONS & RULES, 
THE 2017 MUNICIPAL ELECTION: AN ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS 36–38 (May 9, 
2018), https://fairvote.app.box.com/s/zfu1gdn4zslhw5sbe5t185awzstqxfzp 
[https://perma.cc/596W-J6ZE]; Chris Hughes, Minneapolis Voters Give Ranked 
Choice Voting High Marks After Third RCV Election, FAIRVOTE (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.fairvote.org/minneapolis_voters_give_ranked_choice_voting_high_marks
_after_third_rcv_election [https://perma.cc/V65H-74YL]. Of course, this data may 
not be broadly applicable, as the data is drawn from an unrepresentative sample — 
populations that supported IRV implementation in the first place by voting to 
implement it. 
 100. AMHERST, MASS. HOME RULE CHARTER art. 10, § 10.10 (2018); ST. LOUIS 
PARK, MINN. CITY CHARTER ch. 4, § 4.08 (2018); LAS CRUCES, N.M. H.B. 98 (as 
passed by legislature Mar. 7, 2018); Bennet Hall, Benton Gears Up for Ranked 
Choice, CORVALLIS GAZETTE-TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.gazettetimes.com/news/local/benton-gears-up-for-ranked-
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also seriously considering IRV, if for no reason other than its fiscal 
benefits.101  The final section of this Part discusses one such city — 
New York City — and how the expense of runoff elections has 
spurred calls for reform in the form of IRV. 
E. IRV Advocacy in New York City 
As will be discussed in Part II, New York City has a traditional 
runoff mechanism in place for primaries for three public offices: 
mayor, public advocate, and comptroller.102  In these primaries, if no 
candidate secures at least 40% of the vote, there is a subsequent 
runoff election.103  The subsequent runoff elections, when they have 
occurred, have confirmed one of the main critiques IRV advocates 
posit against traditional runoff systems: they impose a significant 
financial burden on the localities and states employing such a 
system.104  In 2013, the Democratic primary for public advocate went 
to a runoff and the ultimate cost of that election was $13 million, 
while the annual budget for the office of public advocate at the time 
was $2.3 million.105  Apart from the cost, another notable aspect of 
the 2013 runoff election was the decreased voter turnout.  The 
turnout in the initial primary was 18% of the eligible voting 
population, but turnout dropped to less than half of that — 7% — in 
the subsequent runoff.106  Additionally, those who returned for the 
runoff election tended to be older, whiter, wealthier than the initial 
primary voting bloc.107 
 
choice/article_cf6ea193-72b6-51ff-b0b9-38b1262c2e12.html [https://perma.cc/P4WX-
4652] (noting Benton County, Oregon’s adoption of IRV for 2020 elections). 
 101. Jamie Munks, Instant Runoff Voting Survives at the Polls, But Will It Be 




 102. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018). 
 103. Id. For an overview of a traditional runoff voting, see supra Part I.B. 
 104. Kate Taylor, High-Cost Runoff for Public Advocate’s Post Prompts Calls for 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/nyregion/high-cost-runoff-for-public-advocates-
post-prompts-calls-for-reform.html [https://perma.cc/MU7Y-BJWJ]. 
 105. Id. 
 106. New York City Democratic Primary Runoff Turnout: Older Whiter, 
Wealthier Voters, and Low Turnout Overall, FAIRVOTE (Apr. 2018), 
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/NYC-Runoff-Handout [https://perma.cc/2T9Y-JZNG]. 
 107. Id. The racial disparity in runoff voting has prompted a handful of lawsuits 
challenging whether runoff elections are violations of federal law, namely the Voting 
Rights Act. See infra note 202. 
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The results of the 2013 runoff prompted efforts both at the state 
and the city level to implement IRV in order to prevent repeating 
what most saw as an incredibly costly process that could be avoided 
altogether with IRV.  Furthermore, advocates for IRV, likely seeing 
an opportunity for a major victory in bringing IRV to New York City, 
have been increasingly active in pushing for its implementation.108 
At the city level, there have been efforts by local officials to 
implement IRV.  Perhaps most notably, the winner of the 2013 runoff 
for public advocate and current New York Attorney General Letitia 
James has been one of the loudest voices in the city calling for IRV.109  
In addition to (now former) members of the city government like 
James, non-profit advocacy groups like Common Cause New York 
and FairVote have also led the charge to implement IRV in New 
York City.110  Most advocates at the city level have endorsed utilizing 
the Mayoral Charter Revision Commission to implement IRV to 
replace primaries for the city’s three major offices through a charter 
revision.111   In order to do this, the Mayoral Charter Revision 
Commission could include a proposal on a November ballot to utilize 
IRV in city primaries for the three offices currently using traditional 
runoffs.112  Indeed, there is much discussion that the Charter Revision 
Commission will heavily consider the issue in the near future.113 
 
 108. FairVote, one of the leading advocacy groups for IRV, has a dedicated section 
on its website for the purpose of advocating New York City to adopt IRV. New York 
City, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/new_york_city [https://perma.cc/RUS6-
2TWN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 109. At a rally in 2018, James said “I am the face of instant runoff,” pointing to the 
fact that she won the runoff in 2013 that ended up costing far more than her office’s 
annual budget, and saying IRV is the “least expensive, most democratic option” that 
also forces candidates to appeal to a broader voting base. Madina Toure, In NYC, 
Primary Election Runoffs Could Become a Thing of the Past, OBSERVER (May 1, 
2018), https://observer.com/2018/05/new-york-city-instant-runoff-voting/ 
[https://perma.cc/UDM2-Y2N4]. 
 110. Common Cause New York’s website argues that “[IRV] can profoundly 
change the voter experience, the way candidates run their elections, and has the 
potential to reshape local politics.” New York City Needs Ranked Choice Voting!, 
COMMON CAUSE, https://www.commoncause.org/new-york/our-work/voting-
elections/let-nyc-vote-help-bring-ranked-choice-voting-to-the-city/ 
[https://perma.cc/MY34-B6CK] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 111. See, e.g., JERRY H. GOLDFEDER, TESTIMONY AT THE 2019 N.Y.C. CHARTER 
COMMISSION (Sept. 27, 2018) (transcript available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2018435-
CharterRevisionVotingTestimony092718.pdf) [https://perma.cc/X5A8-JPHQ] (“The 
City of New York has the authority to enact [IRV] in municipal elections, as 
articulated by various experts and disinterested parties.”). 
 112. Id.; see Murray Seasongood, The New York City Charter, 51 HARV. L. REV. 
948, 948–49 (1938) (book review); see also Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City 
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However, the charter revision route largely ignores the fact that § 
6-162 — the state election law requiring runoffs in city primaries — 
would likely preempt any change New York City makes to its 
mayoral, public advocate, or comptroller primary elections.114  
Perhaps recognizing this obstacle, multiple state assemblymen and 
senators have introduced legislation in the state legislature to 
implement IRV in New York City primaries.115  The proposed 
amendments, which have been largely identical to each other, would 
change § 6-162 to read, in relevant part: “In the city of New York, any 
city-wide primary elections for the office of mayor, public advocate or 
comptroller, in which more than two candidates appear on the ballot 
for the same office, shall be conducted by instant run-off voting.”116  
While there have been multiple attempts at passing legislation 
including this language, these attempts have all stalled before 
reaching the governor’s desk for signature. 117  However, the politics 
in New York State changed dramatically after the 2018 elections, as 
Democrats, who have been far more active than state Republicans in 
advocating for IRV, took control of the state senate and now control 
both legislative chambers.118  Indeed, among the first bills introduced 
in the state legislature at the beginning of the 2019 legislative session 
was a bill with language identical to that of previously introduced 
legislation.119  The following Part examines the dynamic between city 
and state laws in New York, Election Law § 6-162, and how § 6-162 
complicates New York City’s efforts to implement IRV. 
 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy 
Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV. 807, 828–29 (2013). 
 113. Ben Brachfeld, With Nod from De Blasio and Push from Johnson, 




 114. See infra Part II. 
 115. A.B. 7013A, 2013–14 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); see also Taylor, supra note 104. 
 116. S.B. 3309, 2017–18 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 117. See, e.g., S.B. 3309, 2017–18 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); A.B. 5752, 2017–18 Leg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 6862, 2015–16 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); A.B. 5571, 2015–16 Leg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2015). 
 118. See McKinley & Goldmacher, supra note 23. 
 119. S.B. 2517 2018–19 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
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II. HOME (RULE) IS WHERE THE HEART IS: NEW YORK’S 
ELECTION LAW AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF IMPLEMENTING 
IRV IN NEW YORK CITY 
New York City has, on many occasions, regulated elections in a 
manner that differs from New York State’s Election Law.  For 
example, New York City amended its charter to establish term limits 
on the number of consecutive terms that various elected officials 
could serve, even though the state election law imposed no such 
limits.120  In another example, New York City imposed campaign 
contribution limits that were more restrictive than state contribution 
limits under New York Election Law § 14-114.121  In both of these 
examples, the City’s move to deviate from state election law survived 
judicial scrutiny.122  Given a history of judicial deference to New York 
City’s unilateral deviations from state election law, unilaterally 
implementing IRV through a revision to the City Charter would 
appear to be a perfectly acceptable move by the city.  Indeed, as 
voices within New York City calling for IRV have grown louder, most 
seem to believe that a Charter Revision is all it takes to implement 
IRV.123 
But this belief is incorrect. Because New York State law mandates 
a runoff for three of the most important primary elections in New 
York City, implementing IRV is distinguishable from the previously 
mentioned examples in that it would contradict, not supplement, state 
law.124  Through a general overview of the relevant law in this area, 
this Part will demonstrate this point.  Section II.A.i provides a general 
overview of home rule in New York, with a focus on how the doctrine 
of preemption is generally applied.   Section II.A.ii examines a less 
discussed aspect of New York home rule — preemption via special 
law — and § 6-162 of New York’s Elections Law, which mandates a 
runoff in New York City’s primary elections for mayor, comptroller, 
and public advocate.  Section II.B.i analyzes the legislative history of, 
and legal challenges to, § 6-162.  Lastly, Section II.B.ii focuses 
specifically on New York City and examines the impact of § 6-162 on 
 
 120. Roth v. Cuevas, 158 Misc. 2d 238, 240 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 197 A.D.2d 
369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993). 
 121. McDonald v. New York City Campaign Fin. Bd., 117 A.D.3d 540, 541 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
 122. Id. at 540; Roth, 158 Misc. 2d at 240. 
 123. See, e.g., Background, N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, 
https://www.charter2019.nyc/background [https://perma.cc/ERS3-9K3J] (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2019); GOLDFEDER, supra note 111. 
 124. Supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
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its ability to regulate its local elections, and examine the challenges 
New York City will face when implementing IRV due to interplay of 
§ 6-162, New York home rule, and existing case law. 
A. HOME RULE IN NEW YORK 
i. Preemption Generally 
In the same fashion that the U.S. Constitution delegates certain 
powers (including election regulation125) to the states,126 most states 
delegate certain powers to local municipalities to pass their own laws 
without approval from the state legislature.127  This legal structure is 
known as “home rule.”128  Just as the Tenth Amendment presents the 
U.S. Supreme Court with questions about exactly what powers are 
reserved by the states under the Constitution,129 state courts face 
similar questions in the context of home rule.130  In New York, home 
rule is both a constitutional and statutory construct.131  Article IX of 
the New York Constitution132 provides a “bill of rights” for the state’s 
localities, recognizing that localities need the ability to pass laws that 
regulate matters of strictly local concern, and mandates the legislature 
enact laws “granting to local governments powers including but not 
 
 125. See supra note 25. 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 127. JON D. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, FEDERALISM, DILLION RULE AND 
HOME RULE 6–9 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-
White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7GA-AYYU] (noting 
that 44 states currently provide for home rule); see also David J. Barron, Reclaiming 
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003). 
 128. See DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE 
HANDBOOK 11–12 (2001); Su, supra note 13, at 181–82. 
 129. This has been especially true in recent decades, where Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has reemerged at the Supreme Court, starting in 1991 with Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). See also New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(finding it unconstitutional for Congress to compel state legislatures to adopt laws or 
other regulatory schemes). More recently, the Court expanded the reach of the Tenth 
Amendment in Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, where the Court held that 
Congress could not prohibit states from legalizing and regulating sports betting. 138 
S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018). 
 130. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home 
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1963). 
 131. N.Y. CONST. art. IX. 
 132. Article IX was not an original component of New York’s Constitution, it was 
incorporated into the state constitution through amendments in 1963. See Note, 
Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1966) 
[hereinafter Home Rule]. 
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limited to those of local legislation and administration in addition to 
the powers vested in them by [Article IX].”133  Pursuant to this 
mandate, the legislature enacted the New York Municipal Home 
Rule Law (MHRL) in 1964.134 MHRL provides in pertinent part that: 
(i) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend 
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or 
any general law relating to its property, affairs or government and, 
(ii) every local government, as provided in this chapter, shall have 
power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general 
law, relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to 
the property, affairs or government of such local government, except 
to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a 
local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government 
of such local government: 
a. A county, city, town or village: 
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of 
selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of 
work, protection, welfare and safety of its officers and 
employees, except that cities and towns shall not have such 
power with respect to members of the legislative body of the 
county in their capacities as county officers. This provision shall 
include but not be limited to the creation or discontinuance of 
departments of its government and the prescription or 
modification of their powers and duties.135 
MHRL has two basic components.136  The first restricts the ability 
of the State to interfere in local affairs by passing laws that apply to 
one or more localities, but not to others.137  The second component 
affirmatively grants localities the power to regulate their local affairs, 
as long as those local laws are not inconsistent with any of the State’s 
 
 133. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 134. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW (1964). For a more in-depth discussion about the 
history of home rule in New York, see generally Home Rule, supra note 132. 
 135. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)-(ii)(a)(1)-(2) (1964). New 
York’s constitution also provides a mechanism by which the state legislature can 
grant additional powers to cities that may not necessarily have initially fallen within 
the realm of the home rule provision. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“[The state 
legislature] [s]hall have the power to confer on local governments powers not relating 
to their property, affairs or government including but not limited to those of local 
legislation and administration, in addition to those otherwise granted by or pursuant 
to this article, and to withdraw or restrict such additional powers.”). 
 136. See generally James D. Cole, Local Authority Supersede State Statutes, N.Y. 
ST. B.J., Oct. 1991, at 34. 
 137. Id. 
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general laws or the State Constitution.138  “General law” is a term of 
art, defined specifically within MHRL as “[a] state statute which in 
terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than 
those wholly included within a city, all towns or all villages.”139  By 
contrast, a “special law” is “[a] state statute which in terms and in 
effect applies to one or more, but not all, counties, counties other 
than those wholly included within a city, cities, towns or villages.”140  
For example, a state law that regulates activity as a whole within the 
state — as the majority of state legislation does — is a “general 
law.”141  By contrast, a state law only targeting a locality such as New 
York City is a “special law.”142  If the state wishes to regulate the 
purely local affairs, it must either do so via a general law that applies 
to all of the State’s localities, or, if it wishes to regulate the purely 
local affair of some localities but not others, it must do so via a special 
law.143  However, passing a special law is a procedurally distinct 
process from passing a general law, a distinction that is explored in 
more depth in Section A.2. 
Turning from the state perspective to the local perspective, while 
localities have the power to pass some local laws, that power is 
significantly limited.144  Local governments can only pass laws that are 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. I, § 2(5) (1964). 
 140. Id. § 2(12). 
 141. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cent. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Prendergast, 194, 95 N.E. 715, 
717 (N.Y. 1911) (holding tort damages statute was general law, “for it applies to 
awards made pursuant to any statute of the state for damages sustained by reason of 
any change of grade of any street, avenue, or road in the state[]” as opposed to roads 
in a specific locality). Cf. Osborn v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 289, 289–90 (N.Y. 1936) 
(holding law targeting emergency services in cities with a population over one million 
not a general law, because law had the effect of only targeting New York City). 
 142. See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 993 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 2013) 
(defining the “HAIL Act,” a state law which implemented new regulations for New 
York City yellow cabs, as a special law). 
 143. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1). 
 144. This limitation has been heavily discussed by scholars who argue that home 
rule in all states, not just New York, is being eroded — with localities wielding less 
and less autonomy over matters of local concern. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming 
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003) (“[C]urrent rules of American 
local government law produce a form of home rule that assumes and reinforces a 
view of private property that disables local communities from promoting a different 
kind of development.”); Su, supra note 13, at 193 (“[A]s the response to the recent 
municipal activism illustrates, local policymaking is still largely seen as a novelty. 
States continue to believe that they are entitled to block or overturn local laws, and 
micromanage the policy areas that cities and other localities can address.”); see also 
Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241 (2018) 
(discussing state’s regulatory preemption of cities but their converse “limited appetite 
for preempting plaintiff city litigation”). 
2019] RECLAIMING ELECTORAL HOME RULE 1325 
“not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not 
inconsistent with any general law.”145  This means a locality cannot 
pass laws that are “preempted” by state law.146  New York State can 
preempt local laws in two ways.  First, under what is known as 
“conflict preemption,” a local law is preempted where a local 
government passes a law directly conflicting with New York State 
law.147  Put simply, local law cannot prohibit what state law expressly 
allows, or conversely, local law cannot allow what state law expressly 
prohibits.148  For example, New York State law prohibits the sale of 
tobacco products to individuals under the age of eighteen.149  If a 
locality passed legislation that prohibited the sale of tobacco products 
to only those under the age of 16, such a law would directly conflict 
with state law and would thus be preempted.  However, where a 
locality chooses to prohibit the purchase of tobacco products to those 
under the age of 21, as New York City has,150 such a law is not in 
conflict with existing state law, as localities can impose additional 
layers of regulation that expand existing state law.151  Issues of 
conflict preemption are usually straightforward, in that it will usually 
be obvious based on the plain language of the state and local statutes 
that they conflict with each other.152  Legal challenges to state laws 
conflicting with local laws typically allege that the state does not have 
the ability to expressly preempt a local law in a given field because 
MHRL has reserved regulation of that issue to local governments 
rather than the state.153  Put more simply, it is usually clear whether a 
local statute is facially conflict preempted.  Instead, the issue is 
 
 145. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)-(ii) (1964). 
 146. See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007). 
 147. DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 189–190 (N.Y. 2001). 
 148. Chwick v. Mulvey, 81 A.D.3d 161, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 149. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-cc(1) (2014). 
 150. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 191 Int. No. 1076-A (2017). 
 151. See, e.g., Roth v. Cuevas, 624 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1993) (New York City law 
imposing term limits in addition to those mandated by state law not preempted); 
McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 117 A.D.3d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 
(New York City Law imposing campaign contribution limits in addition to state 
campaign contribution limits not preempted). 
 152. See, e.g., Highway Superintendent Ass’n of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, 150 A.D.3d 731, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (conflict preemption where 
local law required “approval of the town board” to appoint employees to repair or 
maintain highways, while state law vested such power solely in the Highway 
Superintendent). 
 153. E.g., Osborn v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 289, 289–90 (N.Y. 1936). 
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typically whether the state has the authority to expressly preempt 
local law in the given sphere.154 
Local laws can also be field preempted, and the issue of whether or 
not a local law is field preempted is more complex than issues of 
conflict preemption.  Field preemption occurs where the state 
legislature “has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field 
thereby precluding any further local regulation.”155  Field preemption 
can occur in three ways: (1) expressly — where the relevant State 
statute expressly states that it “preempts all local laws on the same 
matter”;156 (2) implicitly through a policy declaration — where “a 
declaration of State policy evinces the intent of the [l]egislature to 
preempt local laws on the same subject matter”;157 or (3) implicitly 
through a detailed regulatory scheme — where field preemption is 
implied due to “the [l]egislature’s enactment of a comprehensive and 
detailed regulatory scheme” in the field at issue.158  Where a court 
determines that a given field has been preempted by the state, a local 
law in that field is considered inconsistent with state law because it 
either (1) prohibits conduct that the state legislature would consider 
acceptable, or at least does not proscribe; or (2) additionally restricts 
rights granted by the state.159  For example, in Consolidated Edison v. 
Town of Red Hook, the New York Court of Appeals found that a 
local law was field preempted because it prohibited conduct that 
would have otherwise been acceptable under a general state law.160  
In that case, Con Edison, a power company that operates in the state, 
announced a plan to study the possibility of opening a new power 
plant in one of two towns.161  One of those towns, Red Hook, quickly 
passed a law that requiring that any company seeking to study a site 
within the town would need to acquire a license from the town, which 
required the company to pay a fee and submit detailed data reports to 
 
 154. See, e.g., id. 
 155. Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk Cty., 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987). 
 156. Chwick v. Mulvey, 81 A.D.3d 161, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see, e.g., DJL 
Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 2001). 
 157. Chwick, 81 A.D.3d at 169; see, e.g., Robin v. Inc. Vil. of Hempstead, 285 
N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1972). 
 158. Chwick, at 169–70; see, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 
505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987); People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981). 
 159. Jancyn Mfg. Corp., 518 N.E.2d at 905. However, “the mere fact that both the 
State and local government seek to regulate the same subject matter does not, in and 
of itself, render the local legislation invalid on preemption grounds.” Ba Mar, Inc. v. 
Cty. of Rockland, 164 A.D.2d 605, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
 160. 456 N.E.2d 487, 491 (N.Y. 1983). 
 161. Id. at 488. 
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the town, and gave the town the authority to deny the license if it 
determined that the proposed activities would be detrimental to the 
town and its residents.162  However, the state had previously enacted 
legislation creating a board that would ultimately decide whether a 
facility should be built on a given site, a decision-making process that 
included weighing the interests of the town containing the site.163  
Because of this, the court found that Red Hook’s local law was field 
preempted by the state.164 
ii. Special Laws: The Home Rule Message Requirement and 
Preemption 
The discussion of preemption by courts and academics typically 
concerns local laws conflicting with general laws or the New York 
State Constitution.  Where a special law is concerned, a preemption 
challenge is rarely raised.  A “special law,” which is a law targeting 
specific localities rather than the state as a whole, has a procedurally 
distinct enactment process prescribed by the State Constitution.  
Article IX provides that the state legislature: 
Shall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or 
government of any local government only by general law, or by 
special law only (a) on request of two-thirds of the total membership 
of its legislative body or on request of its chief executive officer 
concurred in by a majority of such membership, or (b), except in the 
case of the city of New York, on certificate of necessity from the 
governor reciting facts which in the judgment of the governor 
constitute an emergency requiring enactment of such law and, in 
such latter case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members 
elected to each house of the legislature.165 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 490. The court also noted that “[t]he intent to pre-empt need not be 
express[,] [i]t is enough that the Legislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do 
so[,]” and pointing to the regulatory structure the state implemented in order to 
implement the legislation, id., placing this case in the third category of field 
preemption. 
 165. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). MHRL supplements this requirement: 
The elective or appointive chief executive officer, if there be one, or 
otherwise the chairman of the board of supervisors, in the case of a county, 
the mayor in the case of a city or village or the supervisor in the case of a 
town with the concurrence of the legislative body of such local government, 
or the legislative body by a vote of two-thirds of its total voting power 
without the approval of such officer, may request the legislature to pass a 
specific bill relating to the property, affairs or government of such local 
government which does not in terms and in effect apply alike to all counties, 
1328 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
Preemption issues involving special laws are less common than 
those involving general laws.166  Rather, issues involving special laws 
usually come up where the state passes legislation that touches on 
issues of local concern without a “home rule message” by the locality, 
as required by Article IX.167  A valid home rule message is “sent” 
when (1) two-thirds of a local legislature vote to request legislation 
from the state; (2) the chief executive of a given locality along with a 
majority of that localities legislature vote to request legislation from 
the state; or (3) New York’s Governor declares a valid emergency 
and two-thirds of both houses of the State Legislature concur.168 In 
cases where there is no home rule message, those challenging the law 
will urge the court to construe the law as a special law and then 
invalidate the law as procedurally unconstitutional.169  However, even 
where a law is properly classified as a special law, there is no 
requirement that the locality send a home rule message where the 
special law also touches on a “matter of state concern.”170  Because of 
this exception, courts often must grapple with whether the law is one 
that concerns only local affairs, or also involves a matter of state 
 
all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all 
towns or all villages, as the case may be. Such a request may be made 
separately by two or more local governments affected by the same bill. 
Every such request shall declare that a necessity exists for the passage of 
such bill by the legislature and shall recite the facts establishing such 
necessity. The form of request and the manner of its communication to the 
legislature shall conform to rules promulgated by concurrent resolution of 
the senate and assembly pursuant to article three-A of the legislative law. In 
adopting such a request the legislative body shall be governed by the 
provisions of subdivision one of section twenty of this chapter with regard to 
the adoption of a local law. The validity of an act passed by the legislature in 
accordance with such a request shall not be subject to review by the courts 
on the ground that the necessity alleged in the request did not exist or was 
not properly established by the facts recited. 
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 40 (1964). 
 166. This is because, contrary to general laws, localities have some authority to 
supersede special laws. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 167. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1). 
 168. Id. The third option, which does not involve the locality, cannot be used to 
apply special laws to New York City, which the Constitution explicitly exempts from 
this procedure. 
 169. See, e.g., City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc. 
(“PBA I”), 676 N.E.2d 847, 850 (N.Y. 1996); Matter of Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 
908, 912 (N.Y. 1982). 
 170. See Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. City of New York (PBA 
II), 767 N.E.2d 116, 120 (N.Y. 2001) (“Thus, a special law that relates to the property, 
affairs or government of a locality is constitutional only if enacted upon a home rule 
message or the provision bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial 
State concern.”). 
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concern.171  The notion of “a matter of state concern” derives from an 
influential 1929 New York Court of Appeals decision, Alder v. 
Deegan, in which the court set out to define what was encompassed 
by “property, affairs or government” of any local government, the 
regulation of which triggers the protections of Article IX.172  The case 
is most notable for Judge Cardozo’s concurrence, in which he framed 
the test for determining whether something is a matter of state 
concern: “[I]f the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State 
concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are 
concerns of the locality.”173  “Substantial degree,” as developed 
through subsequent case law, means that a special law that does not 
comply with the Constitution’s home rule requirements must “serve a 
supervening State concern,”174 and “relate to life, health, and the 
quality of life [of the People of the State].”175 Additionally, the 
substantial state concern cannot be derived “purely from speculative 
assertions on possible State-wide implication of the subject matter, 
having no support in the language, structure or legislative history of 
the statute.”176 
As a result of Alder and New York’s subsequent case law, if a 
court finds that the law involves a matter of State concern, any 
argument that the law is a procedurally invalid special law falls to the 
wayside, as a special law triggers the home rule message requirement 
only where it regulates matters of purely local concern.177  Perhaps 
 
 171. See, e.g., PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850. 
 172. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929); see James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in 
New York: “The Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 715–19 
(discussing the implications of Alder in the broader context of home rule in New 
York). The law at issue in Alder was whether a state law regulating tenement houses 
only in New York City was constitutional. Alder, 167 N.E. at 706. The purpose of the 
law, the court found, was to ensure that conditions in New York City housing were 
suitable for living. Id. at 710. The court reasoned that this was a matter of public 
health, which was within the state’s police power because public health concerned the 
entire state, rather than just New York City. Id. at 709. Because health concerns did 
not fall into the category of matters of strictly local concern, the fact that the State 
law could be classified as special made no difference, because the home rule 
provisions of the New York Constitution only protect local governments from State 
legislation regulating matters of strictly local concern. Id. 
 173. Alder, 167 N.E. at 705 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 174. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1977). 
 175. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of New York, Inc. (PBA I), 
676 N.E.2d 847, 852 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Wambat Realty Corp., 362 N.E.2d at 585) 
(alterations in original). 
 176. Id. 
 177. The New York Court of Appeals has at times classified matters of local 
concern that also involve matters of state concern as “an exception” to the home rule 
procedural requirements for enacting special laws. PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850 (citing 
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predictably, how courts determine matters of state concern is 
extremely consequential, as too broad of an interpretation has the 
potential to swallow home rule in its entirety.178 
Returning to the issue of preemption, having briefly discussed 
special laws, New York courts have held that, in general, a locality 
can pass legislation superseding a special law.179  The reasoning 
 
Matter of Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1982)); see also Patrolmen’s Benev. 
Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. City of New York (PBA II), 767 N.E.2d 116, 120 (N.Y. 
2001) (“Thus, a special law that relates to the property, affairs or government of a 
locality is constitutional only if enacted upon a home rule message or the provision 
bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial State concern.” (internal 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original)). But the use of the language “exception” 
was not always how special laws were understood. In Matter of Kelley — which the 
Court in PBA quotes in support of its classification of state interests as an 
“exception” to the procedural requirements of a special law — the court never 
classified the state interest as an exception. 443 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1982). In that case, 
the Court rejected the argument that the law at issue was a special law. Id. at 913 
(“The counties argue that the statute is invalid as a ‘special law’ . . . . This argument, 
however, misperceives the nature of the authority under which the Legislature has 
acted.”). The court in Matter of Kelley clarified that “[o]nce a statute is found to 
involve an appropriate level of State interest, the fact that it effects a classification 
among the local governments it regulates does not render the enactment invalid, so 
long as that classification is related and related to the State’s purpose.” Id. at 915. The 
first step in the analysis is “whether a challenged statute involves a matter other than 
the property, affairs or government of a municipality.” Id. at 913. Reading this in 
conjunction with the text of Article IX, the procedural requirements of § 2(b) kick in 
only where the matter is one that solely concerns local property, affairs, or 
government. If matter involves concerns beyond local interests, § 2(b) is no longer 
applicable. See Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 473 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1984) (“The 
limitation upon the power of the Legislature to act by special law in relation to the 
property, affairs or government of a local government contained in article IX (§ 2, 
par. [b], cl. [2] ) of the New York Constitution must be read together with section 3 
(par. [a], cl. [3] ) of the same article, which declares that, ‘Except as expressly 
provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in 
relation to: . . . [m]atters other than the property, affairs or government of a local 
government.’ So read the limitation applies only to a special law which is directly 
concerned with the property, affairs or government of a local government and 
unrelated to a matter of proper concern to State government.” (emphasis added) 
(alterations in original)); see also Hotel Dorset Co. v. Tr. for Cultural Res. of New 
York, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (N.Y. 1978) (“If the subject matter of the legislation is 
of sufficient importance to the State generally, the legislation cannot be deemed a 
local law even though it deals directly with the affairs of a municipality.”). Based on 
the text of Article IX and its subsequent interpretations, it would seem to follow that 
a law that is both a special law and one that touches on matters of state concern is an 
oxymoron. However, the Court of Appeals has changed its understanding in recent 
decades and now understands there to be two kinds of special laws: ones that involve 
matters of purely local concern and ones that involve matters of both local and state 
concern. See, e.g., PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 120; PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 850. 
 178. See infra notes 229–31 and accompanying text. 
 179. “There is no . . . requirement that a local law be consistent with a ‘special law’ 
enacted by the Legislature. A ‘special law’ may thus be superseded by a validly 
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emerges from the text of MHRL § 10, which states in part that “every 
local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent 
with any general law relating to its property, affairs or 
government.”180  Because this section only refers to general laws, 
courts have interpreted this as allowing local laws that are 
inconsistent with special laws.181 
Despite this, MHRL § 34 does impose certain restrictions on a 
locality’s ability to supersede special laws.182  While § 34 includes 
 
enacted local law.” Gizzo v. Town of Mamaroneck, 36 A.D.3d 162, 165 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006); see also Ricket v. Mahan, 97 A.D.3d 1062, 1063 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); 
Landmark Colony at Oyster Bay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 113 A.D.2d 741, 741 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1985). Some have said that special laws that also involve matters of state 
concern preempt localities to which that special law does not apply from passing local 
laws that are inconsistent with that special law. But existing case law does not support 
this interpretation of the law. In an article appearing in the New York Law Journal, 
the author claimed that preemption “has been construed also to bar local legislation 
that is inconsistent with special laws (i.e., laws applying to specified municipalities but 
not to the entire state) where those laws touch on matters of state concern.” Jeffrey 
D. Friedlander, Setting Limits: Litigation Between Mayor, City Council, N.Y. L. J. 
(Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/ar3708.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7GA-AYYU]. In support of this statement of the law, the author 
cites to two cases. The first, DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, was a case where 
the issue was whether the State’s Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Law field 
preempted a city zoning law regulating the location of “adult establishments.” 749 
N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 2001). The case had absolutely nothing to do with special laws or 
what constitutes a matter of state concern. Indeed, neither “special law” nor “state 
concern” is mentioned once throughout the opinion. The second case, Matter of 
Slominski v. Rutkowski, did not concern preemption whatsoever, instead it 
concerned a county executive’s refusal to certify the need to fill certain vacancies 
within the county government, pursuant to the county charter. 91 A.D.2d 202, 203 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
 180. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (2018). 
 181. See, e.g., Ricket, 97 A.D.3d  at 1063. For those interested in such things, this 
reading of the text subscribes to the “omitted-case canon,” or “casus omissus canon,” 
which is “[t]he doctrine that nothing is to be added to what a legal instrument states 
or reasonably implies; the principle that a matter not covered is to be treated as not 
covered.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93–100 
(1st ed. 2012). 
 182. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34 (2019). In Baldwin Union Free School 
District v. County of Nassau, the New York Court of Appeals spoke on the issue. 9 
N.E.3d 351 (N.Y. 2014). In that case, the court was presented with the question of 
whether a county could pass a local law that shifted the obligation to pay property tax 
refunds from the county to its individual taxing districts, which superseded a special 
state tax law. Id. at 353. Nassau County adopted an alternative form of government in 
the early 20th century that was established by state legislation and acquired its 
charter and local legislative powers via a state-drafted charter, thus it lacked the 
ability in many areas to unilaterally amend its charter — which included its tax code. 
Id. at 354. The County, in order to change its tax code, petitioned the State through a 
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many limitations,183 the limitation that is important for the purposes 
of this Note is found in § 34(3)(g), which prohibits localities from 
superseding the state’s Election Law, regardless of whether the 
pertinent local election law is general or special.184  The importance of 
this restriction will become apparent in the following section, which 
will discuss New York Election Law § 6-162 and how it complicates 
New York City’s ability to amend its charter and unilaterally 
implement IRV. 
B. The Intersection of State and Local Election Law: § 6-162 
i. The History of § 6-162 
New York’s Election Law, enacted as a general law in 1909, first 
sought to establish boards of elections in the state’s counties.185 
 
home rule message pursuant to Article IX of the Constitution. Id. at 355. The state 
subsequently enacted the requested legislation, but some decades later, the County 
sought to unilaterally amend its tax code. Id. at 354–57. The court held that even 
though the County’s tax code was a special law, because it concerned “the 
distribution of the proceeds of taxes or benefit assessments” (quoting N.Y. MUN. 
HOME RULE LAW § 34(3)(a)), the law could only be amended by the county 
“pursuant to an express and unambiguous delegation of authority by the state 
legislature.” Id. at 356, 361. 
 183. The exemption includes any law: 
Which relates to the imposition, judicial review or distribution of the 
proceeds of taxes or benefit assessments; Insofar as it relates to the 
educational system in the county or to school districts therein, except that 
functions, powers or duties assigned to units of local government or to 
agencies or officers thereof outside the educational system may be 
transferred to other units of local government, agencies or officers as 
authorized by [§ 34]; Which requires that specified functions of government 
be performed by or financed by units of local government, except that any 
of such functions may be transferred to other units of local government, 
agencies or officers as authorized by this article; Insofar as it relates to a 
function, power or duty of the state or of any officer or agency thereof 
which is financed directly by the state; Insofar as it relates to the 
commencement or prosecution of actions or proceedings against the county; 
Insofar as it relates to a public benefit corporation; In this chapter or in the 
civil service law, eminent domain procedure law, environmental 
conservation law, election law, executive law, judiciary law, labor law, local 
finance law, multiple dwelling law, multiple residence law, public authorities 
law, public housing law, public service law, railroad law, retirement and 
social security law, state finance law, volunteer firefighters’ benefit law, 
volunteer ambulance workers’ benefit law, or workers’ compensation law. 
N.Y MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 34(3)(a)–(g). 
 184. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34(3)(g). 
 185. One New York court gave the following historical description of New York’s 
Election Law: 
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Today, it covers many aspects of elections taking place within the 
state at all levels.186  The story of the relevant portion of New York’s 
Election Law for purposes of this discussion — § 6-162 — begins in 
the late 1960s.  The 1969 mayoral election in New York City was an 
unusual one.  In the Democratic primary, Herman Badillo and 
Robert Wagner received 28% and 29% of the vote, respectively.187  
This allowed a third Democratic candidate, Mario Proccacino, to win 
the nomination with 33% of the votes.188 Proccacino would go on to 
lose the general election to incumbent John Lindsay.189  Democrats, 
who held a significant majority in the state and city legislature, felt 
that they had lost the mayoral race because their two strongest 
candidates, Badillo and Wagner, had split the vote and allowed 
Proccacino, a less popular candidate, to emerge as a weaker 
Democratic nominee, thus handing the election to Lindsay.190 
A few years later in 1972, Democratic State Assemblymen Stanley 
Steingut and Albert Blumenthal sponsored a bill that would create a 
primary runoff mechanism for primaries in New York City.191  
Proponents of the bill argued that “it was designed to avoid a repeat 
of the 1969 ‘fluke’ Proccacino result, when a candidate who clearly 
 
The Election Law which this act amends is a general law. As originally 
enacted by chapter 22 of the Laws of 1909, it provided for a board of 
elections in cities of the first class containing one or more counties (the city 
of New York), and for a single commissioner of elections in each of the 
counties of Erie, Monroe, Onondaga, and Westchester. It vested in the 
individual commissioners, respectively, of the counties named, powers and 
duties similar in some respects to those of this Niagara county act. 
Vroman v. Fish, 181 A.D. 502, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918). 
 186. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-102 (2005) (“This chapter shall govern the conduct of 
all elections at which voters of the state of New York may cast a ballot for the 
purpose of electing an individual to any party position or nominating or electing an 
individual to any federal, state, county, city, town or village office, or deciding any 
ballot question submitted to all the voters of the state or the voters of any county or 
city, or deciding any ballot question submitted to the voters of any town or village at 
the time of a general election. Where a specific provision of law exists in any other 
law which is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, such provision shall 
apply unless a provision of this chapter specifies that such provision of this chapter 
shall apply notwithstanding any other provision of law.”). 
 187. Butts v. City of New York (Butts II), 779 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1985); see also 
Robert B. McKay, Butts v. City of New York: Race, Politics and the Run-Off 
Primary, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 499, 501 (1987). 
 188. Butts II, 779 F.2d at 143. It is worth noting here that this is an excellent 
example of the results traditional runoffs and IRV are designed to prevent. See supra 
Section I.D. 
 189. Butts II, 779 F.2d at 143. 
 190. Id. at 143. 
 191. Id. at 143. 
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did not represent the views of a majority of the members of his party 
secured the nomination because of the vicissitudes of vote 
division.”192  Those who opposed the bill were concerned that a 
runoff mechanism would disproportionately dilute the minority 
vote.193  Additionally, there was also a deep suspicion that § 6-162 had 
racist motivations and was to intended to prevent Harman Badillo, 
the first Puerto Rican to run for citywide office, from securing a 
victory in a future election, as the bill became known in Albany 
circles as the “Badillo bill.”194  Nonetheless, the bill easily passed the 
State Senate, 49 votes to 8, as well as the State Assembly, 104 votes to 
5, and was signed into law by Governor Rockefeller as New York 
Election Law § 131-a in 1972.195  At the time it was signed into law, § 
131-a applied to all cities in New York with a population above one 
million people. Yet, in 1972, the only city that met this criterion was 
New York City.196  The law was amended in 1976 and then again in 
1978 to include its current, New York City-specific language and 
become New York Election Law § 6-162.197 It was last amended in 
1993, to reflect the change in title for leader of the City Council from 
“President” to “Public Advocate.”198  However, in a 2002 charter 
revision, the duties of the public advocate were transferred to the 
 
 192. Id. at 143–44. 
 193. Id. at 144. This was the issue that would ultimately be the grounds for the 
Voting Rights Act challenge to § 6-162. Infra note 202. These same concerns continue 
to be raised by skeptics of IRV. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 194. Butts v. City of New York (Butts I), 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
rev’d, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 195. Butts I, 614 F. Supp. at 1550; see also McKay, supra note 187, at 501. 
 196. § 131-a stated: 
Any inconsistent provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in cities 
having a population of one million or more, in any case in which no 
candidate for the office of mayor, city council president or comptroller 
receives forty percent or more of the votes cast by the members of a 
political party for such office in a city-wide primary election, the board of 
elections of such city shall conduct a run-off primary election between the 
two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office. 
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972). 
 197. N.Y. ELEC. LAW art. I, § 6-162 (2018). Section 6-160, which has no runoff 
mechanism, applies to all primary elections in the state outside of New York City. 
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160 (2018) (“If more candidates are designated for the 
nomination of a party for an office to be filled by the voters of the entire state than 
there are vacancies, the nomination or nominations of the party shall be made at the 
primary election at which other candidates for public office are nominated and the 
candidate or candidates receiving the most votes shall be the nominees of the 
party.”). This is a simple FPP system for primaries. See supra Section I.A. 
 198. 1993 ch. 418. N.Y. Laws 8131. 
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Council Speaker.199  Section 6-162 now prescribes the procedure for 
runoff elections in arguably the most important New York City 
primaries in the event no candidate receives at least 40% of the 
vote.200 Subsection (1) states: 
In the City of New York, when no candidate for the office of mayor, 
public advocate, or  comptroller receives forty percent or more of 
the votes cast by the members of a political  party for such office in 
a city-wide primary election, the board of elections of such city shall 
conduct a run-off primary election between the two candidates 
receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office.201 
The next section discusses the various legal challenges § 6-162 
faced after its enactment and how courts, both state and federal, have 
interpreted § 6-162. 
ii. Legal Challenges to § 6-162 
Since its inception, § 6-162 of New York’s Election Law has faced a 
variety of legal challenges.202  Most relevant to the focus of this Note 
was an initial challenge to § 6-162 (codified as § 131-a at the time) on 
the grounds that it violated New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law.  
In Procaccino v. Board of Elections of the City of New York,203  
plaintiff Mario Proccacino, whose primary victory spurred the state 
 
 199. See Diane Cardwell, Betsy Gotbaum, the Advocate, Struggles to Reach Her 
Public, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/02/nyregion/betsy-gotbaum-the-advocate-struggles-
to-reach-her-public.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm [https://perma.cc/L36D-TJEQ] 
(“A charter proposal backed by Mayor Bloomberg and passed on Nov. 5 has already 
stripped the public advocate of one role, serving as presiding officer of the City 
Council.”). 
 200. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162. 
 201. Id. 
 202. One such challenge was under the Voting Rights Act, where minority 
candidates argued that runoff elections had both the purpose and effect of diluting 
the minority vote in New York City, an argument the Southern District of New York 
found convincing. Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
However, the Southern District’s decision was overturned on appeal by the Second 
Circuit. Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Oakes 
dissented, however, finding that because the effect of § 6-162 was discriminatory, the 
question of purpose was irrelevant to the ultimate question of whether there was a 
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Id. at 151 (Oakes, 
J., dissenting); see also Arnold H. Lubasch, City Runoff in Primaries is Upheld, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/14/nyregion/city-runoff-in-
primaries-is-upheld.html [https://perma.cc/BU5W-QFBX]. For a more in-depth 
discussion of the Voting Rights Act and runoff elections, see generally Matthew G. 
McGuire, Note, Assessing the Legality of Runoff Elections Under the Voting Rights 
Act, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 876 (1986); Ballard, supra note 46 
 203. 73 Misc. 2d 462 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1973). 
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legislature to enact § 6-162 just three years earlier, challenged the 
provision on the grounds that it violated Article IX of the State 
Constitution, because § 6-162 was a special law enacted absent a 
home rule message and did not involve a matter of state concern.204  
The court agreed that § 6-162 was a special law, but held that primary 
elections for certain New York City offices were matters of state 
concern, thereby exempting § 6-162 from the home rule message 
requirement.205  This opinion was notable for both its discussion of a 
special election law’s preemption effects, as well its broad 
construction of what constitutes an issue of statewide concern.  The 
court first addressed the question of whether or not § 6-162 was a 
special law, which was not immediately clear, because, at its 
inception, § 6-162 did not explicitly name New York City in its 
application.206  Looking to the test employed by Judge Cardozo in In 
re Elm St. in City of New York,207 under which a law that applies to 
populations (i.e., cities with a population over 1 million) “only to 
designate and identify the place to be affected” is considered a local 
law and therefore can only be enacted by the state via special law, the 
court concluded that § 6-162 was indeed a special law.208 
Although it classified § 6-162 as a special law, the court held that it 
did not violate the home rule message requirements of Article IX 
because, under Alder, it sufficiently touched on a matter of state 
concern.209  The court’s application of Alder is worth reading in its 
entirety: 
[I]t may be concluded that the legislative enactment under 
consideration does not conflict with article IX of the State 
Constitution, because it clearly relates to a matter of State concern 
and the run-off procedure delineated therein is part of the election 
process (see Matter of Devoe v. Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Colonie. 11 
A.D.2d 602).  In positioning this conclusion on the basis of State 
concern, the force of section 1 of article IX of the State Constitution 
lends itself in pertinent part: “Effective local self-government and 
intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the 
state”.  This declaration significantly forms the policy basis 
 
 204. See id. at 463. Procaccino also challenged § 6-162 on the grounds that it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, id. at 469, but this 
aspect of this case is not relevant for the purposes of this Note. 
 205. Id. at 468–69. 
 206. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972); see supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 207. 158 N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1927). 
 208. See Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 468 (finding “no doubt that the act is special 
and not general”). 
 209. Id. at 468–69. 
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underlying section [6-162] of the Election Law, to wit, adjustment of 
the primary election process to better reflect the will of a majority or 
sizable plurality of voters.  In this accomplishment the State’s 
concern cannot be initially frustrated.210 
The court’s reasoning on this point is somewhat difficult to unpack, 
and its citations to Matter of Devoe and to the State Constitution do 
not shed much light on the court’s rationale.  Concisely stated, the 
court concluded that the “the election process” is inherently a matter 
of state concern, and because runoff procedures are part of the 
election process, they necessarily touch on matters of state concern.211  
To support this conclusion, the court cites to Matter of Devoe, a case 
concerning a village law that mandated a random draw in the event of 
a tie in an election to fill a vacancy on the village’s board of 
trustees.212  The question before the court was whether the village law 
conflicted with Article I § 9, and the now repealed Article IX § 9 of 
the State Constitution.213  Article I § 9 of the State Constitution, at 
the time Matter of Devoe was decided, prohibited localities from 
conducting lotteries and the act of selecting the winner of the village’s 
election at random was challenged as an unconstitutional lottery.214  
Further, Article 9, § 9 of the State Constitution provided that local 
officers should be elected by the voters of those localities.215  The 
court held that the draw in the event of a tie violated neither of these 
constitutional provisions, essentially saying that in the event two 
candidates received enough votes to tie, it still reflected the will of the 
people if either one of those candidates won the election.216 
It is unclear how this holding supports the court’s reasoning in 
Procaccino.  The court appears to lean on Matter of Devoe for the 
 
 210. Id. at 468. 
 211. Id. at 467–69. 
 212. 11 A.D.2d 602, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). 
 213. Id. at 611–12. 
 214. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 215. The full text of Article IX, § 9 provided: 
All city, town and village officers whose election or appointment is not 
provided for by this constitution shall be elected by the electors of such 
cities, towns and villages, or of some division thereof, or appointed by such 
authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for that purpose. All 
other officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by this 
constitution and all officers whose offices may hereafter be created by law 
shall be elected by the people or appointed, as the legislature may direct. 
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (repealed). 
 216. “The choice being limited to the candidates receiving an equal and the 
greatest number of votes, the expressed will of those who have voted is effectuated as 
nearly as may be.” Matter of Devoe, 11 A.D.2d at 706 (internal quotation omitted). 
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proposition that runoffs are part of the election process, yet this still 
does not explain how the local election process itself is a matter of 
state concern.  Perhaps the court was referring to New York Election 
Law § 15-126, which mandates runoffs for villages in the State of New 
York in the event of a tie217 (and the candidates in Matter of Devoe 
agreed to forgo)218 to demonstrate how the state already mandates 
runoffs in local elections and that shows this is a matter of state 
concern.  But § 15-126 is a law that applies with equal force to all 
villages within the state — that is, § 15-126 is a general law.219  Recall 
that the state can regulate matters of purely local concern via general 
law,220 so this also fails to explain the court’s conclusion in 
Procaccino. 
The court’s reference to Article IX, § 1 of the State Constitution is 
also unhelpful in deciphering its conclusion.  The opinion states that 
the preamble (§ 1) to Article IX, “[e]ffective local self-government 
and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the 
state,”221 forms the underlying policy of § 6-162. This translates to 
“adjust[ing] [] the primary election process to better reflect the will of 
a majority or sizable plurality of voters.”222  The court does not go on 
to explain how this relates to the policy underlying Article IX, nor 
how that underlying policy supports its conclusion. 
The opacity of the conclusion that the use of runoffs in three of 
New York City’s primaries involve matters of state concern 
notwithstanding, the court also fails to address the local election 
carveout in MHRL § 10.223  The carveout states in part that local 
governments shall have the power to adopt laws relating to 
“[t]he . . . mode of selection . . . of its officers.”224  While Procaccino 
 
 217. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 15-126 2(b) (2018). 
 218. Matter of Devoe, 11 A.D.2d at 611. 
 219. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 220. The state legislature “[s]hall have the power to act in relation to the property, 
affairs or government of any local government only by general law . . . .”. N.Y. 
CONST. art. IX § 2. 
 221. Id. § 1. 
 222. Procaccino v. Bd. of Elections of the City of New York, 73 Misc. 2d 462, 467 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). 
 223. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)–(ii)(a)(1) (2018). 
 224. Id. While New York courts have rarely discussed what exactly is encompassed 
by this phrase, a Court of Appeals case from 1927 described it in the following way 
when interpreting a predecessor to MHRL: “The term ‘mode of selection’ expresses 
an intent to allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause its officers either to 
be elected or appointed but connotes also that a municipality may define the precise 
method by which either an election or appointment shall be effected.” Bareham v. 
City of Rochester, 158 N.E. 51, 53 (N.Y. 1927). 
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never squarely addressed this aspect of MHRL, it held that New York 
City could simply supersede § 6-162 if it so chose.225  This conclusion 
overlooked another section of MHRL, § 34, which contains various 
restrictions on localities’ ability to supersede special laws.226  
Specifically, § 34(3)(g) states that “a county charter or charter law 
shall not supersede any general or special law enacted by the 
legislature . . . [i]n . . . [the] election law.”227  Thus, MHRL § 34(3)(g) 
seriously calls into question one of the fundamental justifications 
motivating the Procaccino court’s conclusion. 
While Procaccino provided little justification for its conclusion that 
§ 6-162 involves a matter of state concern, appeared to ignore 
legislation that explicitly carved out this aspect of local elections as 
matters of local concern, and appeared to fundamentally 
misunderstand the preemption effects of a special election law, its 
ruling was never appealed; both Procaccino and § 6-162 remain good 
law.228  This area of election law is a symptom of a larger erosion of 
home rule in New York due to the State concern doctrine.229  In the 
context of New York City, the state concern doctrine has grown 
increasingly broad and has swallowed much of the power that would 
appear to reside with the City.230  The erosion of home rule is not 
 
 225. Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 469. 
 226. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34 (2019). 
 227. Id. 34(3)(g) (emphasis added). 
 228. While Procaccino has not received much judicial or scholarly attention since it 
was decided, when § 6-162 was challenged in federal court as a violation of the Voting 
Rights Act in Butts v. City of New York, the court briefly discussed the ruling in 
Procaccino. The court noted that although “[t]here was no Home Rule request 
before the enactment of [§ 6-162] . . . . the court in Procaccino upheld the statute, 
relying in part on the presumption of constitutionality attached to any legislative 
enactment.” Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1548 (S.D.N.Y 1985) 
(citing Procaccino at 465). The court then extensively recounted § 6-162’s legislative 
history, noting that Republican leadership in the State Senate took the position that § 
6-162 “was solely a matter affecting the internal affairs of the City of New York.” Id. 
at 1551. Yet, “no Home Rule request had been received from the legislative body of 
that city, as ordinarily would be thought to be required under the New York 
Constitution, Article IX, § 2(b).” Id. 
 229. See Report and Recommendations Concerning Constitutional Home Rule, 
N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N (2016), https://www.nysba.org/homerulereport/ 
[https://perma.cc/9G8F-K77X] (“The State concern doctrine has narrowed the Home 
Rule clause’s guarantee of a modicum of local legislative autonomy. Today, the line 
between matters of State concern and matters of local concern is increasingly 
indistinct. Few constraints exist of the Legislature’s ability to interfere in local affairs 
by special law.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State of New York, 993 N.E.2d 393, 400 
(N.Y 2013) (finding regulation of New York City taxicabs to be matter of state 
concern); City of New York v. State of New York, 730 N.E.2d 920, 926–27 (N.Y 2000) 
(finding matter of state concern in easing burden on non-New York City residents 
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unique to New York — on the national scale, local authority has 
increasingly been constrained or removed altogether in recent 
years.231 
III. THE PATH OF MOST RESISTANCE: A ROADMAP TO IRV IN NEW 
YORK CITY 
IRV would significantly improve New York City’s elections and, at 
the very minimum, should be implemented to replace existing runoff 
primary elections.  This Part first argues that from a policy 
perspective, IRV should be adopted by New York City, as well as by 
other cities and states, because it leads to a fairer, cheaper, and more 
democratic elections.  However, this Part also argues against 
implementing IRV through the state legislature by amending § 6-162 
or via charter revision while § 6-162 remains in effect.  Instead, 
implementing IRV by repealing or striking down § 6-162, and then 
revising the City Charter to implement IRV, is in the best long-term 
interest of the City.232 
A. Policy Considerations in Implementing IRV 
IRV systems have little downside and considerable upside, and 
IRV elections have been largely successful where implemented.233  In 
 
who commute into City); Uniformed Firefighters Ass’n v. City of New York, 405 
N.E.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. 1980) (finding residency of New York City employees to be 
matter of state concern). 
 231. See Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 
128 YALE L.J. 954, 964–974 (2019). Professor Davidson attributes much of this to in-
state redistricting that locks in partisan advantages that allow a single party to more 
easily control both houses of a given state legislature and the governorship. Id. at 964. 
When a single party reaches this level of in-state political domination, “[t]here is 
evidence of a tipping point institutionally with respect to preemption.” Id. Professor 
Davidson concludes: 
As a result, states in recent years have sought to constrain or remove local 
authority across a striking range of policy areas and with increasing 
vehemence. This wave of preemption reflects a mix of deregulatory 
libertarianism — particularly focused on employment, the environment, and 
technology — and social conservatives’ concerns about religious liberty and 
reducing immigration, forming a shared agenda of reducing local power. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Anti-
Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 199 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 848 (2019) (noting 
how after federal efforts to curtail the power of sanctuary cities (typically cities that 
refuse to comply with federal immigration initiatives) largely stalled, states housing 
sanctuary cities have begun curtailing the autonomy of sanctuary cities to comply 
with the federal government). 
 232. Supra Section II.B.ii. 
 233. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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New York City, IRV should be implemented if for no other reason 
than to replace existing runoff primary elections, which have proven 
to be both expensive and under-inclusive.234  While voter education 
initiatives may impose some up-front costs on the City,235 those costs 
will be negligible when compared to the money saved by forgoing 
runoff elections.236  The criticisms of IRV should not be ignored, 
however, and local and state governments should pay close attention 
to the concerns that IRV critics raise.237  Perhaps the most important 
of these criticisms is that voter confusion that may occur in IRV 
systems could disproportionately affect poor communities and 
communities of color.238  The City should take this into account when 
implementing voter education programs to ensure that these 
communities are adequately included in these programs.  The City 
should also keep a close eye on data from IRV elections in order to 
evaluate whether its education initiatives are equally effective across 
the socioeconomic spectrum. 
However, the argument for implementing IRV — adequately 
discussed by experts in the social sciences239 — is not the primary 
focus of this Note.  Instead, this Note focuses on how New York City 
 
 234. Supra Section I.D. 
 235. Supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 236. For a discussion of the costs associated with IRV, see supra notes 81–101 and 
accompanying text. In the state of Massachusetts, the estimated cost of state-wide 
voter education was $500,000. Rhode, supra note 84. The population of 
Massachusetts is just under 7 million. See Massachusetts Population 2019, WORLD 
POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/massachusetts-
population/ [https://perma.cc/VPZ6-GLJC] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). The 
population of New York City, on the other hand, is about 8.5 million. See New York 
City, New York Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV., 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/new-york-city-population/ 
[https://perma.cc/3AMK-33Y4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). While there may be 
additional factors to consider in this comparison, it is difficult to see how those 
factors could bring the cost for voter education in New York City anywhere close to 
the $13.8 million the 2013 runoff cost the City. See Taylor, supra note 104. 
 237. See generally supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 238. Supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 239. See generally, e.g., COREY COOK & DAVID LATTERMAN, RANKED CHOICE 
VOTING IN THE 2011 SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL ELECTION: FINAL REPORT (2011), 
https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1002&ccontex=mccarthy_fac [https://perma.cc/3UP7-U7ZB]; 
Jim Anest, Ranked Choice Voting: A Path Toward a More Integral Politics, 4 J. 
INTEGRAL THEORY & PRAC. 3 (2009); Francis Neely et al., An Assessment of 
Ranked-Choice Voting in the San Francisco 2004 Election, PUB. RES. INST. (May 
2005), http://archive.fairvote.org/sfrcv/SFSU-PRI_RCV_final_report_June_30.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VP6M-FFMK]. 
1342 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
should implement IRV.  To that end, the remainder of this Part 
explores various options and makes a recommendation. 
B. New York City’s Paths to Implementing IRV Under Current 
State Law 
As IRV has gained traction in New York City, there are increased 
calls to implement IRV for city primaries through a Charter Revision, 
which would involve having City voters consider the issue on election 
day.240  Under the current state of the law, the City would need to 
exclude from the consideration primary elections for mayor, 
comptroller, and public advocate241 — the elections that IRV would 
most benefit.242  New York City cannot implement IRV for these 
elections; § 6-162, a “special law” within New York’s Election Law,243 
cannot be superseded by a New York City charter revision, because § 
34 of the Municipal Home Rule Law prohibits exactly this.244  The 
examples provided in Part II, where New York City unilaterally 
introduced laws concerning campaign finance245 and term limits,246 
are distinguishable from the IRV issue in an important way — in both 
of these cases, the applicable state election law was a general law, not 
a special law like § 6-162.247  As discussed in Part II, a locality like 
New York City can pass local laws that are more restrictive than a 
state general law.248  As long as the City’s laws do not permit what 
would otherwise be restricted under state law, the City’s laws should 
not be preempted.249  In the case of IRV, the City could 
hypothetically pass a law that imposes a runoff where no candidate 
captures 50% of the total vote, as opposed to 40% like it is now.250  
But can this city replace runoffs with and IRV system with a 
threshold above 40%?  This option, among others, is discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
 
 240. Supra Section I.E. 
 241. Infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra Section I.D. 
 243. See supra Section II.B. 
 244. Supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 245. Supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 246. Supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 247. Supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra Section II.A.i. 
 249. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 250. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018). 
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i. A City IRV Statute with a Vote Threshold Greater than Forty 
Percent 
One could argue that, because § 6-162 is only triggered in a primary 
“when no candidate for the office of mayor, public advocate or 
comptroller receives 40% or more of the votes cast,”251 an IRV statute 
that required a candidate to obtain any percentage of the vote greater 
than 40% would not be inconsistent with § 6-162.  Because § 6-162 
does not say how that initial primary vote needs to be conducted, it 
could be argued that the law would not prohibit the use of IRV.  In 
this scenario, where the IRV statute mandated, for example, a 50% 
vote threshold,252 then after the initial IRV election, a candidate 
would never have less than 40% of the vote and thus § 6-162 would 
never apply. 
While there may be some merit to this argument, it should 
ultimately be rejected for a few reasons.  First, a plain reading of § 6-
162 would suggest that it only authorizes the use of a traditional 
runoff system for primary elections, not other systems in place of a 
runoff — such as IRV.253  Second, this method would essentially 
render § 6-162 obsolete, which would be contrary to the presumption 
against ineffectiveness with which statutes should be read.254  Third, 
while it could be argued that the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 6-
162 was to prevent low plurality primary winners,255 and that purpose 
would not be frustrated by introducing IRV in place of traditional 
runoffs, IRV was not something the legislature contemplated at the 
time § 6-162 was drafted. Although this argument may have 
legislative purpose on its side, other, more widely accepted methods 
of statutory interpretation weigh against this argument. 
Adopting IRV under this understanding of § 6-162 would leave the 
IRV statute exposed to a possible legal challenge based on the 
previous points.  IRV laws have been challenged on multiple 
occasions256 and there is no reason to believe the same will not occur 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 253. “[W]hen no candidate . . . receives forty percent or more of the votes 
cast . . . [the] city shall conduct a run-off primary election between the two candidates 
receiving the greatest number of votes for the same office.” N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 
(emphasis added); see supra note 201. 
 254. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 181, at 93–100. 
 255. See supra Section II.B.i. 
 256. See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fourteenth 
Amendment claim against San Francisco’s IRV system); Me. Republican Party v. 
Dunlap, 324 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D. Me. 2018) (Maine Republicans brought First 
Amendment freedom of association claim after the state adopted IRV). The First 
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in New York City.  Further, the power to regulate these primary 
elections would still reside with the state, which could amend § 6-162 
in the future in a variety of ways that may be contrary to the desires 
and interests of New York City.  For these reasons, it would be 
unwise for New York City to proceed in this manner. 
ii. Abolishing Primaries to Circumvent § 6-162 
Another more plausible argument is that New York City could 
simply eliminate primary elections in favor of a single, general IRV 
election for New York City’s most important local positions.  Section 
6-162 is only triggered during a primary election,257 but an IRV 
system could replace the primary system in New York City 
altogether, thus rendering § 6-162 obsolete.  This would be a wise 
policy choice and New York City would not be the first city to choose 
to replace its primary system entirely by implementing IRV.258  
Indeed, one of the promises of IRV is that it can replace a primary 
election, saving the expense involved in conducting a separate 
election prior to a general election.259  Besides eliminating the 
expense of holding a primary elections — not to mention the costs 
involved in holding a subsequent runoff election should no candidate 
reach the 40% threshold — a single IRV election would avoid low-
turnout primary elections, thereby involving more of the city’s 
population in the electoral process.260 
While there is nothing in the text of § 6-162 that directly contradicts 
such a maneuver,261 there would still likely be a question under this 
course of action as to whether § 6-162 implicitly requires primary 
elections for mayor, comptroller, and public advocate.  Two of same 
points mentioned in the previous scenario would also apply here.  A 
reading that the statute does not require primary elections would 
render § 6-162 obsolete, but at the same time one could argue that 
 
Amendment argument against IRV derives from the series of Supreme Court cases 
concerning primary election regulations, discussed supra note 51. See, e.g., Dunlap, 
324 F. Supp at 208–13 (discussing the various burdens IRV in primary elections 
imposes on a party and weighing them against the state regulatory interest in 
implementing IRV). 
 257. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018) (“when no candidate . . . receives forty percent 
or more of the votes . . . in a city-wide primary election, the board of elections of such 
city shall conduct a run-off primary election” (emphasis added)). 
 258. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 259. Supra Section I.C. 
 260. Supra Section I.D. 
 261. See supra notes 147–52. 
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because the statute (or any other state law) does not explicitly require 
primary elections, a requirement should not be read into the statute. 
Legislative intent and purpose are also relevant when considering 
this argument.  It is reasonable to assume that the legislature never 
contemplated that there would not be a primary election at the time § 
6-162 was drafted.  In fact, primaries may have been so embedded in 
the legislature’s understanding of how elections should be conducted 
that it did not believe an explicit requirement would be necessary.  In 
other words, the legislature may have never considered it necessary to 
write a requirement for primary elections into the statute.  As to 
purpose, replacing primary elections with IRV would likely still be in 
line with the purpose of § 6-162, which was to avoid low plurality 
winners.  As discussed in Part I, IRV elections can largely prevent 
vote-splitting among members that leads to the opposing, more 
unified party’s victory — which is the underlying purpose of primary 
elections. 
One additional point worth discussing is whether § 6-162 has the 
effect of field preempting New York City from eliminating primary 
elections, or, for that matter, changing its primary elections for 
mayor, comptroller, public advocate in any manner whatsoever.  As 
previously discussed, the New York State legislature can express its 
intent to completely occupy a field either expressly or impliedly.262  
The text of § 6-162 does not expressly state the legislature’s intent to 
occupy the field of primaries for the three offices mentioned in § 6-
162.263  Where, as is the case in other special laws, the statutory text 
expressly prohibits the locality from passing any laws in the given 
field, the legislature has unequivocally expressed intent to occupy that 
regulatory field.264  The text of § 6-162 contains no such language, so 
there’s little question that there is no express intent by the State to 
occupy this field. 
Nor does there appear to be any implied intention by the 
legislature to occupy this field.265  The legislative history of § 6-162 
indicates that the purpose of § 6-162 was not to restrict New York 
City’s ability to regulate how it conducts its elections.266  Rather, the 
law was intended to prevent candidates from winning primaries by 
obtaining a low percentage of the vote in a crowded electoral field.267  
 
 262. See supra Section II.A. 
 263. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-162 (2018). 
 264. See supra Section II.A.i. 
 265. See supra notes 155–64. 
 266. See supra Section II.A.i. 
 267. See supra Section II.B.i. 
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Additionally, the state has never employed any type of regulatory 
scheme to further this goal.268  For these reasons, it seems clear that 
New York City is not field preempted by § 6-126. 
On balance, it is difficult to say one way or the other whether the 
elimination of primary elections would be permissible under § 6-162.  
This uncertainty, however — even if the uncertainty is low — makes 
this a risky path for the City.  An IRV law eliminating primary 
elections in New York City would be susceptible to a legal challenge 
and, the state would still retain the ultimate authority to regulate. 
Additionally, the elimination of primary elections is a drastic 
change to the election process that would require considerable 
adjustment on the part of candidates as well as parties.  How party 
resources would be distributed among multiple party candidates 
running in the same general election is one of the major issues that 
comes to mind when discussing this option.  While there are likely 
solutions to these problems and the ultimate elimination of primary 
elections is a worthy goal, this could perhaps be a case where the City 
tries to run before it has learned to walk.  Small steps, beginning with 
the implementation of IRV to replace existing primary runoffs, are 
probably the wisest course of action. 
While each of the solutions discussed thus far provides a possible 
means by which New York City could unilaterally implement IRV, 
the City does not necessarily need to act unilaterally in order to 
implement IRV. 
iii. Amending § 6-162 Via the State Legislature 
One of seemingly more obvious solutions to this issue is for the 
State Legislature to amend § 6-162 in the way previous bills have 
suggested.269  Although the current legislature in Albany may be 
more favorable to IRV,270 relying on the legislature is an undesirable 
solution.  First, history has demonstrated that bills attempting to 
amend § 6-162 have failed to gain enough support to clear both 
houses of the State Legislature.271  Second, while IRV may seem like 
the best option for the City today, a better system could be 
introduced in the future, and the City would need to once again go 
through the State — which may not view the new system favorably — 
in order to implement this system.  Further, while the state political 
 
 268. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 115–17. 
 270. See supra notes 23, 118. 
 271. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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climate may currently be favorable to IRV advocates, that could also 
change in the future.  Most importantly, however, amending § 6-162 
would allow the State to retain authority over an aspect of New York 
City’s elections that should be reserved to the City under New York’s 
home rule doctrine and the State Constitution.272  The final section of 
this Note will discuss this issue and propose a path forward. 
iv. Challenging § 6-162 as Unconstitutional 
Section 6-162 is a clear violation of New York’s Constitution and 
Municipal Home Rule Law.  The initial version of § 6-162 included 
language that attempted to masquerade a special law as a general 
law,273 in that the statute applied to “cities with a population above 1 
million.”274  Of course, the legislature knew at the time that the effect 
of the law was to target only New York City — the only city in the 
state at the time with a population above one million people.275  This 
allowed the State to circumvent the procedures required for 
implementing a special law — namely a request from the locality to 
do so, something the City never did.276  One question that arises here 
is why the State Legislature felt the need to avoid naming New York 
City specifically.  If this was so clearly a matter of state concern, it is 
interesting that the State was reluctant to pass § 6-162 as a facially 
special law. 
The legislature also received significant assistance from the state 
judiciary when the law was challenged in Procaccino,277 where the 
court’s decision was seriously flawed multiple respects.  As an initial 
matter, the Court’s reasoning that New York City can simply 
supersede § 6-162 when it sees fit278 is a borderline reckless reading of 
the law.  As the text of § 32 of MHRL make very clear, a locality has 
no ability to supersede a special law found within the Election Law.279  
This understanding of § 32, which only requires a plain reading of the 
 
 272. Consider an example in 2002, where the state amended § 6-162 to apply to 
public advocate instead of the president of the city council. See supra notes 198 and 
accompanying text. 
 273. Procaccino v. Bd. of Elections of City of New York, 73 Misc. 2d 462, 468 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1973) (finding § 6-162 to be “a local law masquerading as general”). 
 274. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 131-a (1972). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Supra Section II.B.i. 
 277. 73 Misc. 2d 462. 
 278. Supra Section II.B.ii. 
 279. Supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. 
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text free from any interpretive heavy lifting, has since been applied by 
the New York Court of Appeals with ease.280 
Even putting aside this fundamental misunderstanding of special 
law preemption in the context of election laws, the court still ignores § 
10 of MHRL, which makes clear that “the method of appointment” of 
local officers is a matter of local concern.281  While the State certainly 
has an interest in elections generally,282 MHRL makes clear that the 
method of appointment of strictly local officers is a matter reserved to 
the locality.283  In Procaccino, the proffered matter of statewide 
concern accepted by the court is the “adjustment of the primary 
election process to better reflect the will of a majority or sizable 
plurality of voters.”284  It is hard to see how this can be a matter of 
state concern based on New York’s jurisprudence in this area.  As 
discussed earlier, a matter of state concern must “be in a substantial 
degree a matter of State concern.”285  To substantially relate to a 
matter of state concern, the matter must “serve a supervening State 
concern”286 and “relate to life, health, and the quality of life” of the 
people of New York State. 287  There must be a state-wide concern 
involved that is “supported in the language, structure, or legislative 
history of the statute.”288  The opinion failed to address any of these 
elements with reasonable rigor, which is further evidence that 
Procaccino was wrongly decided. 
 
 280. See, e.g., Baldwin Union Free School Dist. v. County of Nassau, 9 N.E.3d 351 
(N.Y. 2014); see also Monahan v. Murphy, 71 A.D.2d 92, 94 (1979), aff’d, 412 N.E.2d 
1326 (1980) (“no county charter or charter law shall supersede the Election Law”); 
Mohr v. Giambra, 7 Misc. 3d 723, 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 27 A.D.3d 1185 
(2006) (“The provisions of the Election Law . . . cannot be superseded by [county 
charter]” (citing NY. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34(g)(3))). 
 281. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 2, § 10(1)(i)-(ii)(a)(1)-(2) (1964). 
 282. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that 
government must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical matter, 
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest 
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 
415 U.S. 724 (1974)). Clearly, states governments have an interest in assuring “that 
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.” Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Procaccino, 73 Misc. 2d at 467. 
 285. Alder v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 705 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J., concurring); see 
also supra notes 149–55. 
 286. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1977). 
 287. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benv. Ass’n of New York, Inc., 676 N.E 2d 
847, 852. (N.Y. 1996). 
 288. Id. 
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First, the legislative history shows that § 6-162 was really the result 
of state Democrats reacting to an election result they did not like.289  
There is also ample evidence that § 6-162 was passed in part because 
of racist motivations by state Democrats, who believed that Herman 
Badillo — the first Puerto Rican to run for New York City office and 
secured 28 of the vote in the 1969 mayoral primary — came too close 
to winning the Democratic nomination.290  There is nothing in the 
legislative history of § 6-162 that would suggest that the State 
Legislature was even remotely considering a statewide interest when 
it passed § 6-162.  Nor does the text of § 6-162 appear to implicate a 
statewide interest. 
Further, the Court fails to explain why, if ensuring primary 
elections were decided with a larger plurality of the electorate, the 
legislature chose only to implicate this interest for three primary 
elections in New York City.  If the state was really concerned with 
protecting this interest, why not enact similar legislation for statewide 
elections?  Indeed, the three aforementioned offices in New York 
City are the only elections in which the Election Law requires a 
runoff.  It would seem to follow that if this was truly a significant 
statewide interest, the state would enact similar legislation for 
gubernatorial elections, as well as for state and federal congressional 
elections.  But no such runoff laws exist, and the Court never asked 
why. 
Ultimately, the holding that primary elections for three officials 
who serve only the City of New York is a matter of state concern 
stretches the imagination and begs the question — if the mode of 
selection in local primary elections for strictly local officers are 
matters of state concern, what is not a matter of state concern?  
Following this reasoning, the doctrine of home rule becomes a paper-
thin shield for New York localities, standing little chance of 
protecting purely local interests against an increasingly powerful 
regulatory sword wielded by the State.291 
For the aforementioned reasons, the case against the 
constitutionality of § 6-162 is strong.  While state lawmakers from 
New York City who are introducing legislation to amend § 6-162 
likely believe they are acting in the best interest of the City, they 
would be truly acting in the best interest of the City by repealing § 6-
162.  An alternative option to abolishing § 6-162 is by challenging it in 
 
 289. See supra Section II.B.i. 
 290. See McKay, supra note 187, at 501; see also note 194 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 144. 
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a court as unconstitutional, where it is difficult to see how a court 
would agree with the Procaccino court’s assessment of the law.  
Either of these options would unambiguously clear the way for New 
York City to implement IRV through a charter revision.  Moreover, it 
would transfer local electoral power back to the people of New York 
City, power that was unconstitutionally usurped by the State in the 
first place. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1927, the New York Court of Appeals said in Bareham v. City of 
Rochester that “[t]he term ‘mode of selection’ expresses an intent to 
allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause its officers either 
to be elected or appointed but connotes also that a municipality may 
define the precise method by which either an election or appointment 
shall be effected.”292  This principal perfectly captures the issue 
underlying the discussion in this Note and makes clear that § 6-162 is 
incompatible with long-held principles of home rule.  For too long, 
this usurpation of local power to determine the mode of selection by 
which purely local officers are chosen has gone unchallenged.  The 
IRV conversation in New York City presents both the City and the 
State with an opportunity to restore the proper dynamic between 
those areas of regulation reserved to the state and those reserved to 
localities.  While the policy arguments regarding IRV and the 
elimination of primary elections will further develop as more cities 
and states experiment with this voting system, what remains clear — 
the task of evaluating IRV for New York City’s elections should 
reside solely with New York City’s citizens. 
 
 292. 158 N.E. 51, 53 (N.Y 1927). 
